The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force
The PLARF is a unique military institution responsible for land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces. With its vast arsenal of missiles, the PLARF poses a significant threat.
Flag of the PLARF - the yellow represents the flare of a missile, the characters refer to the founding date of the PLA.
China’s People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is a unique military institution. It is responsible for the land-based arm of Chinese nuclear forces, currently larger than the naval and air nuclear arms, and the world's largest conventional ground-based missile force. It possesses hundreds of nuclear-armed ICBMs in silos and mobile launchers. As well as cruise missiles, it is equipped with thousands of conventionally armed ballistic missiles with ranges from 300-13,000km that can accurately target and potentially overwhelm missile defenses in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and even US military bases in the Pacific. The PLARF has enough anti-ship missiles to attack and overwhelm the defenses of every US ship currently based in the region.
When the PLARF was created in 1966, it was known as the Second Artillery Force. It was mainly responsible for China’s small number of nuclear weapons, which Chinese leaders only envisioned as a deterrent to nuclear conflict. After Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he drove the expansion, modernization, and increased lethality of China’s rocket forces and reformed the SAF into PLARF in 2015. Under his premiership, the PLARF has transitioned into a full People’s Liberation Army branch, equivalent to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and begun a worrying expansion of nuclear weapons.
The PLARF is critical to Xi’s transformation of the Chinese military into a force capable of challenging the foremost military in the world—that of the United States. The PLARF is crucial in enabling a successful invasion of Taiwan, by far the most strategically important operation China’s armed forces must plan for. While it is still possible to counter the impressive missile force China has assembled, this will require a change of thinking Taiwan currently lacks and resources the US is hesitant to provide.
Second Artillery Force
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) first detonated an atomic weapon on October 16th, 1964, nearly 60 years ago, and quickly demonstrated a hydrogen bomb two years later. Mao Zedong had felt it necessary to build nuclear weapons after President Eisenhower threatened to use nuclear forces against China in 1955 during the First Taiwan Straits Crisis, and because he felt the Soviet Union would also engage in nuclear coercion as the two communist nations’ relations worsened throughout the 1950s and 60s. Mao and subsequent Chinese leaders never thought nuclear weapons were inherently valuable as a means of threatening other nuclear powers. As such, China adopted a “no first use” policy and did not significantly invest in the nuclear component of the Second Artillery Force, created in 1966. Until the 2010s, the SAF only had 18 ICBMs in silos and 12 mobile launchers with missiles that could reliably reach the mainland United States, kept at a low state of readiness.
Chinese military engineers and scientists raising Mao’s little red book in celebration of a Chinese nuclear test.
China's nuclear warhead stockpile was equally reserved, only numbering around 150-250 warheads from 1974-2010, compared to the roughly 16,000 in the Soviet stockpile in 1974. The SAF received a small amount of investment relative to the full branches of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). China did not deploy the first generation DF4 liquid-fueled ICBM until 1975. This missile was not a Soviet design, although the first Chinese ballistic missiles were built with Soviet assistance. While ICBMs can be either solid or liquid-fueled, solid-fueled missiles are preferred for weapons purposes because they can be fired faster (even a modern SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket takes 35 minutes to fuel), are more reliable, can be stored for longer, and are less unstable. A liquid-fueled US Titan II missile exploded in its missile silo in 1980, killing one technician, injuring 21 others, and throwing its 740-ton silo door and nine-megaton warhead hundreds of feet away.
While the SAF’s nuclear capabilities were only intended to deter nuclear powers, it started to build up its conventional ballistic missile capabilities, becoming responsible for conventional missile strike operations in 1993. The development of a large conventionally armed ballistic missile arsenal was partly due to the desire to research and develop more effective means of delivering nuclear payloads, but it was possible because China did not sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This 1987 agreement between the USA and Soviet Union limited missile development with ranges between 500-5500km. The SAF’s arsenal allowed the PRC to threaten attacks beyond the capability of its outranged army and outclassed air force. However, US defense experts considered the SAF an object of secondary importance. In the annual Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Report for 2014, the SAF merited discussion for three paragraphs out of 96 pages.
Transformation under Xi
As of 2024, the PLARF has over 300,000 men split into six main “bases” (numbering 61-66) equivalent to a corps-level command, plus three additional bases responsible for storage and handling of China’s nuclear warheads (Base 67), the construction and maintenance of PLARF sites and missile silos (Base 68) and the testing and training of the PLARF (Base 69). The numbered bases from 61-66 each have a geographical area of responsibility. Base 61 corresponds to the southeastern area of China opposite Taiwan, Base 65 covers South Korea and Japan, and Base 64 and 66 are located in central and western China and hold long-range ICBMs.
Within the Base units, the PLARF is split further into brigade-level units, which, depending on the missile type, have between 12 and 36 launchers per brigade. Each brigade holds a single kind of missile type, so the 611 brigade of the 61st base is thought to be equipped with DF-26 IRBM with a range of 3- 4,000km, enough range to cover US military bases in Guam, Japan, and South Korea. Brigades also have enough equipment, in the form of mobile launchers, cranes, carriers, and support vehicles, to enable the units to move within China and fight independently of one another. The PLARF also has two universities, the Rocket Force Engineering University in Xi’an, Shaanxi, responsible for training the majority of PLARF officers (akin to West Point for the US Army), and the Rocket Force Command College in Wuhan, Henan, which appears to offer further professional military and engineering courses for officers. The PLARF has 41 brigades, over 1000 mobile launchers, and over 2200 missiles deployed, with more launchers and missiles currently being built. It is hard to estimate the production rate of the various missiles that manufacturers such as the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (which builds all of the PLARFs ICBMs) and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (which describes itself as the largest missile manufacturer in China) are capable of, but it is significantly greater than US manufacturing capability - potentially up to six times faster than US procurement capacity.
Among the varied arsenal of the PLARF, the DF15, DF17, DF21, and DF41 are particularly relevant to Taiwan and any US intervention. “DF” refers to Dong Feng or East Wind, but the numerical categorization following DF does not refer to any particular convention or increase in effectiveness - DF17 is a hypersonic glide vehicle, for example, while the DF5 is an ICBM. The DF15 is a mobile launched short-range surface-to-surface missile family first developed in 1988, which has seen extensive testing and upgrades, including a “bunker buster” variant, the DF15C, designed to attack hardened bunkers. In the case of Taiwan, which aims to shelter its F16 fighters in the event of an outbreak of conflict with the PRC, the DF15 is a significant threat. The missile has a 500 kg warhead, and the PRC is estimated to produce 50 of these missiles a year.
The DF17 is a missile designed to deploy the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle traveling over Mach 5 to a target up to 1600 km away. Due to its astonishing speed, the DF-ZF poses significant challenges to existing missile defense systems on US ships and ground installations. Although the DF17 has been tested at least nine times since its development in 2014 (with one failure) and is a potent threat, it is not currently thought to be able to attack moving targets such as aircraft carriers. It only makes up a small proportion of PLARF forces, as only two of the PLARF 41 combat brigades are equipped with DF17s.
DF21 is a road-mobile solid fuel missile family first developed in 1991 with a maximum range of 1800km that can be fired with only a few minutes of preparation time, allowing brigades equipped with it to maneuver to avoid potential counterfire. One variant, the DF21-D, is the first anti-ship ballistic missile, becoming available to the PLARF’s predecessor in 2012. The DF21-D is China’s fastest medium-ranged ballistic missile, reaching speeds of up to Mach 10 in the terminal flight phase, posing a significant challenge to the AEGIS missile defense system the US Navy uses to protect its ships and carrier battle groups. Although deemed the “carrier killer” by US defense analysts, a single missile would not be enough to cripple a carrier battle group, but ballistic missiles such as this are not intended to be used alone.
In a conflict between China and the US, the PLARF would likely use dozens of these missiles to overwhelm US Navy missile defenses, ideally cooperating with attacks from the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy’s missiles and submarines. Although Base 61 (the PLARF unit responsible for Taiwan) is not thought to have a brigade equipped with this missile, Base 65, closer to Japan (where the US 7th Fleet is based), does have at least one brigade equipped with DF21-D. The US Navy has recently shown that it can shoot down ballistic missiles fired at its ships by the Houthis in Yemen. Still, although these attacks have been sustained over several months, the US Navy has not faced a saturation-style attack of dozens of anti-ship ballistic missiles at any one time. Even with the relatively low scale of attacks, the US Navy has spent interceptor missiles (at the cost of $5m per unit) to such an extent it is now recertifying older missiles to rebuild stockpiles. War does not obey the rock-paper-scissors logic of a computer game and DF21-D threat does not render a carrier useless; but it would likely force it to operate further away until Chinese air defenses are degraded to such an extent that US forces could strike and suppress PLARF units, allowing the US Navy to move closer to any hotspot. In the case of an invasion of Taiwan, the more time the PLA can buy for a successful operation, the greater the chance of outright victory or Taiwanese capitulation, if it becomes clear the US is unable or willing to bring its forces to their aid.
DF21D missiles on parade in Beijing.
Lastly, the DF41 is a road-mobile ICBM capable of launching nuclear and non-nuclear payloads up to distances of 15,000km, the range of an Airbus A350 jetliner. The DF41 was initially conceived in 1986, but the DF31 missile superseded the DF41’s development. The DF41 was tested seven times within China from 2012 to its deployment in 2019, but in September 2024, the PLARF launched a DF41 missile over the Philippines into the sea near French Polynesia, a test it claimed was successful. This successful test firing, combined with the nuclear warhead capability of the DF41, potentially demonstrates the ability of the PLARF to launch a nuclear strike at a sea-based target. However this is very unlikely, particularly if the PLARF can disable and disrupt US units seeking to enter into battle against the PLA using conventional weapons alone.
Chinese nuclear doctrine has been historically based upon the “no first use” principle. China’s small stockpile was envisioned as a retaliatory capability, and unlike the US, China has never publicly threatened the use of nuclear weapons. Since 1945, the US publicly threatened to use nuclear weapons twice in the Korean war, once during the 1955 Taiwan straits crisis, and in 1991 Secretary of State James Baker handed a letter from President G W Bush to the Iraqi foreign minister communicating an explicit threat of nuclear retaliation if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons on US troops. The US to this day reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first. Although the no-first-use policy remained Chinese policy after Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, the transformation of the SAF into the PLARF has been accompanied by a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. China now possesses 500 operational nuclear warheads, and the US expects this to grow to 1000 by 2030.
PLARF delivery systems include more nuclear-capable DF26, DF31, and DF41 mobile launchers, as well as more missile silo sites being built in China’s eastern regions. Some media reports suggested these sites were not functional or suffered from faulty construction, but any prudent US nuclear strategy must assume they are operational. In a full-scale nuclear war, even if these sites are not functional they would have to be targeted, drawing resources away from other targets and potentially allowing more mobile forces to survive and retaliate. Other media reports concerning the PLARF have focused on corruption, the potentially poor state of PLARF equipment, and their ability to maintain it. One story claimed that PLARF missiles had been filled with water instead of fuel, but this report is based only on one defector's claims and remains unconfirmed. In any event, the vast majority of the PLARF missiles are solid-fueled, meaning this would have only affected a small number of China’s missiles even if true. Although it is difficult to assess the true potential of the PLARF’s equipment, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows how poorly international assessments of military preparedness and utility can turn out, when leader of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022, the PLARF fired 11 missiles around the island to demonstrate its readiness. Unlike in 1996 when the SAF launched missiles during the 2nd Taiwan Strait Crisis, none of the missiles malfunctioned.
Corruption in the PLARF and PLA more generally continues to be a pervasive issue, and Xi has fired several serving and former PLARF commanders since beginning a corruption purge within the PLA in 2023. Corruption can mean not just selling or failing to maintain equipment, which has been so devastating to Russia since 2022; but also the selling of promotions, leading to incompetent officers in charge of units. However, outside of the PLA China is a deeply corrupt country, and although officials and officers may be charged with corruption, it is not clear if that is the actual reason they have been removed from their postings, or if they are being removed due to a lack of (real or perceived) loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party and to Xi. Continually removing officers, although embarrassing, may be an ongoing process to stamp authority on military units and better prepare them for conflict.
Dealing with the PLARF
The impressive growth of the PLARF should also be considered within the context of the upgrades the PLA, PLAN, and PLAAF have received under Xi Jinping. In a conflict with Taiwan or any other neighbor, it would not fall solely on the PLARF to disable, destroy, and suppress an enemy's capabilities, but be a part of a broader spectrum of options the Central Military Commission can call upon to achieve its objectives. However, the PLARF has arguably the most significant potential to deliver blows to critical military and civilian infrastructure. Being responsible for the majority of China’s nuclear forces, it also has a growing ability to deter any US nuclear strike and keep the PLA’s advantages of size and proximity to the conflict zone in play.
Winning a war is not as simple as launching missiles and blowing up enemy assets, as the US found in Afghanistan and Russia has in Ukraine. The recent Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel which involved hundreds of missiles have shown that saturation attacks can be blunted and result in minimal damage if the defender is adequately prepared. However, Taiwan is much closer to mainland China than Iran is to Israel, and would have less time and forewarning of a ballistic missile attack from the PLARF or guided rocket artillery fired by the PLA.
For Taiwan, upgrading its missile defenses must be the absolute priority. Neither Taiwan nor the US can currently win a ballistic missile arms race with China, which has a massive head start and significant future resources it could further dedicate to such an effort. Taiwan’s current missile defenses are wholly inadequate to counter the PLARF or PLAAF. Taiwan relies heavily on its small air force to provide anti-missile and anti-air capabilities, with fewer resources devoted to ground-based air defense and naval-based anti-ship and anti-air missiles. This is partly due to the Taiwanese perception of its air force as an elite, but also because having jets flying around shows the population the airspace is protected during peacetime, despite their vulnerability in a conflict. It is investing heavily in air-to-air missiles (Sky Sword III) and hopes to spend $4.5 billion to acquire new F16 jets. Taiwan should operate with an assumption that the PLARF and PLAAF will attack its air bases and that its small air force will not be able to operate as Israeli, US and British fighters did to provide air defense against Iranian missiles in April 2024.
Taiwanese ground-based missile defense consists of seven Patriot PAC2 batteries, the Avenger Air Defense System, and the Tien-Kung/Sky Bow system, supplemented by Sky Sword 2 and MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) on Taiwanese navy vessels. Like the Sky Sword missiles fielded by the Taiwanese Air Force, Taiwan should assume its small navy would either be destroyed or kept outside the conflict area by PLARF and PLAN assets (if it could sail before a conflict broke out). While the Patriot missile system is a capable system for targeting cruise missiles, UAVs, and short-range ballistic missiles, and Taiwan is currently buying the latest PAC3 GEM system, it is expensive (costing around $4m per interceptor missile)and relatively immobile, taking an hour to set up and shoot.
The Avenger system is only suitable for defending against slower-moving cruise missiles and UAVs, a valuable asset in defending against an invasion but unable to counter most PLARF missiles. Tien-Kung/Sky Bow III is an indigenously produced missile system designed to intercept aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles, costing about 1/6th of a PAC3 interceptor. Taiwan should seek to massively expand the procurement of its domestically produced Sky Bow III surface-to-air missiles. However, Tien-Kung/Sky Bow cannot intercept DF17 Hypersonic missiles, and the relatively small numbers of launchers in all of Taiwan’s missile defenses and small stockpiles means they would likely be overwhelmed by PLARF attacks, and could not adequately defend against saturation attacks alongside PLAAF and PLA UAVs, missiles and drones. Taiwan should assume that additional stocks of Patriot air defense missiles will be unable to reach the island by air or sea in the case of a conflict. If China and Taiwan were to go to war, Taiwan's missile defenses would quickly run out of missiles and be rendered ineffective.
Tien-Kung III (Sky Bow III) Surface-to-Air Missile System
All of Taiwan's billions of dollars spent on new fighter jets, tanks, artillery, and ships will be wasted if Taiwan cannot provide adequate air defense that can survive PLARF strikes. Taiwan urgently needs to expand its stocks of air defense missiles and should seek to indigenously produce more effective missile defense to intercept faster and longer-range PLARF ballistic missiles. While the Arrow missile system developed by Israel and the US is expensive, Taiwan needs more interceptors to defend against the PLARF’s more advanced missiles. Ideally, Taiwan should expand its spending on defense to as much as 6% of GDP to build up a robust missile defense capability. By preparing adequate air defenses to absorb PLARF strikes, Taiwan will force the PLARF to spend resources that would otherwise be aimed at the US Navy and air forces coming to Taiwan’s aid. Taiwan's geography, economy, and people should make it incredibly difficult to conquer. If it is not willing to genuinely prepare itself to fight and throw off a potential Chinese invasion, the US should seriously consider if it is willing to fight for a state that does not take its defense seriously.
The PLARF poses a significant challenge for the US Navy, even before additional Chinese military units enter the playing field. Although US Air Force bomber units could potentially launch strikes on PLARF bases in China, a US fleet sailing to Taiwan would have to operate under the assumption that it will come under sustained ballistic missile attack the likes of which the US Navy has never seen before. The US urgently needs to rebuild its depleted stockpiles of air defense missiles, make more air defense destroyers such as the Arleigh Burke class available for deployment to the Far East, and speed up the development of air defense lasers to neutralize drone threats from the PLAN and PLA to enable the limited surface to air missiles available to destroy incoming ballistic missile attacks. Like Taiwan, the US desperately needs to expand the production of missiles. In helping Israel defend against the October 2024 ballistic missile attack, the US expended an entire year's worth of output of SM-3 ballistic missile interceptors. In a conflict with China, the US would run out of missiles within weeks, if not sooner.
Conclusion
Xi Jinping aimed to modernize and grow the PLA into a force capable of fighting and winning modern conflicts. The PLARF is possibly the best example of the success of this endeavor. It now possesses thousands of conventional ballistic missiles capable of overwhelming Taiwanese missile defenses to enable an invasion by the PLA and PLAN. Learning from Iraq, Libya, and latterly, Ukraine, Chinese political leadership has learned that without a robust nuclear deterrent, the US and others will intervene in any conflict with a geopolitical adversary, necessitating an expansion of China’s nuclear forces. While more survivable nuclear assets, such as submarine-based ICBMs, are expanding slower, the PLARF has taken on this burden without any notable accidents or failures. The PLARF is so much more capable than Taiwan's missile defenses that the island may choose to submit without the majority of its arsenal even being fired.
The transformation of the PLARF should be yet another wake-up call that China is preparing to fight and win a conflict. Although the political and economic costs of doing so are possibly too great to contemplate at the moment, the PLARF demonstrates that China is gaining considerable ground and perhaps approaching a once-in-a-generation opportunity to use force to achieve the unification of China under communist rule.