The United States Space Force
America’s newest military branch guards the satellites that make modern war possible. Can it keep them safe in the next great-power conflict?
Since the launch of the first American military satellite, Explorer 1, in 1958, the United States has developed increasingly sophisticated capabilities in space to enhance its formidable military might. A military presence in orbit is now a vital part of the American way of war. Yet despite the centrality of space to modern combat, the US resisted creating a dedicated space branch of its armed forces until 2019, when the US Space Force was launched to an unfortunate reaction. Rather than welcoming the newest addition to the existing five US armed services, the fact that it was President Trump's proposal, along with the uniforms and logo, and the “Guardians” name, overshadowed serious debate about the service’s purpose.
Since then, the USSF has quietly grown in importance and had a budget of $29.4 billion in 2025, nearly as much as the entire Canadian or Israeli militaries. The process of transferring assets to the USSF while maintaining the capabilities that space assets provide to the US Air Force, Navy, Army, and intelligence services has taken some time. The Biden administration has supported its mission, signaling bipartisan consensus, however reluctant, on its strategic value. It is now responsible for operating and defending military satellites, tracking foreign objects in orbit, monitoring global missile launches, managing space-based command and control, and conducting cyber and electromagnetic operations in the space domain. It is likely developing offensive counter-space capabilities, and as the US civilian space industry lowers the cost of transport to and from orbit, may also become responsible for the rapid deployment of military assets around the globe.
Aside from the considerable challenge of integrating existing US military space assets, the USSF competes with the significant legacy capabilities of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the growing threat from the People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force, which has emerged as a serious peer competitor. Backed by an advancing space sector, China is positioning itself as a direct rival in orbital operations. To preserve the space-based foundations of American military superiority, the Space Force must find ways to deny adversaries the ability to disrupt US orbital infrastructure. Unlike the other US armed services, which face serious questions about their ability to replace munitions in a peer-to-peer war, the USSF’s challenges are more about providing resilient systems. In a future war, especially over Taiwan, the Space Force would not be a sideshow. However understated its role in public, it will be a critical actor in any American victory.
Origins and Purpose
As Nazi Germany began its bloody collapse under the combined might of the Allies in February 1945, the US began to identify German scientists who had worked on advanced technologies such as the V1 and V2 rockets, eventually recruiting them under Operation Paperclip. Many of these scientists would form the genesis of the US space program, initially led by the US Army. After the US Air Force took responsibility for military space operations, working with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to build up satellites for reconnaissance (launching the CORONA satellites beginning in 1959) and communications (the Initial Defense Communications Satellite Program in 1966) purposes. The idea of a separate military organization to coordinate space operations was first raised in the 1960s, but was fiercely resisted by the Air Force, which did not want to see a dilution of functions related to nuclear command and control systems in the depths of the Cold War. The existence of the NRO, already a hybrid organization with CIA and Air Force personnel, weakened the argument for another military service, as did the small number of satellites in orbit on military missions. In the 1960s and 70s, the military presence in space was crucial for intelligence gathering, early warning, and communications, but it was not yet integrated into the kill chain of identifying, attacking, and assessing damage in the way it would later become.
Although the Air Force took the lead in military space operations, the Air Force, Army, and Navy all maintained their own research programs and missions. When President Reagan announced the creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Government Accountability Office called for the USAF to be reorganized as the US Aerospace Forces, combining all US military space operations with the air domain, but this was rejected. The fragmented arrangements, with each service running its own space missions, persisted until 1982, when the Air Force established Air Force Space Command to centralize and coordinate its space operations. That was followed in 1985 by the creation of the United States Space Command, a unified command responsible for overseeing space operations across all military services. The US Navy, Army, and Marine Corps followed the Air Force in establishing Space Commands that report to the overall Space Command.
The number of US satellites and their capabilities had increased significantly in the years leading up to the first Gulf War. For the first time, space assets were directly integrated into the kill chain and a new doctrine called AirLand Battle. Reconnaissance satellites operated by the NRO enabled high-resolution imagery of Iraqi forces and infrastructure, feeding targeting decisions and post-strike assessments. The Defense Satellite Communications System, first launched in 1966, provided real-time links between commanders and frontline units, allowing rapid coordination and strike authorization.. Cruise missiles, aircraft, and ground units all relied on satellite positioning to execute strikes with far greater accuracy and speed than in any previous conflict. The evisceration of the Iraqi command and control systems and collapse of its armed forces by the allied coalition, with only three days of ground combat, in combination with the deployment of stealth aircraft such as the F-117, led to a profound rethinking of how US forces could be defeated in combat, especially by the Chinese military. The bombing of the Chinese Embassy eight years later by NATO forces reinforced just how vulnerable China was to US airpower dominance enabled by GPS.
37th Tactical Fighter Wing F117 taking off during Operation Desert Storm
Although China’s economic position in the early 1990s meant its military could not afford the necessary technology in the short term and its own space capabilities, not just in the military realm, were minimal. China had no military communications satellites, its reconnaissance satellites (the Fanhui Shi Weixing series) were about as advanced as 1960s US technology which had to be returned to earth to view images with a resolution of 10-20 meters (compared to US 10 to 15cm resolutions) and its launch vehicles were unreliable and only capable of carrying a maxium of 3000kg to orbit. The PLA recognised that it needed a far greater presence in space if it was to challenge the US. As China grew richer and could afford to develop more advanced military platforms for its Army, Navy, and Air Force, its space capabilities took precedence over developing newer nuclear weapons, as space was recognized as being crucial to enabling modern warfare.
While the US was able to muster a coalition to meet the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian space forces did not fall out of orbit as statues of Lenin came down. Despite severe financial difficulties for the Russian Armed Forces in the 1990s, space capabilities were mostly maintained under the newly created Russian Space Forces (VKS-VS), which kept the Oko system of early warning satellites, the Tselina system (which provided space-based electronic intelligence), the Gorizont, Raduga, and Strela military communication system and retained and operated Baikonur Cosmodrome (leased from Kazakhstan) and Plesetsk Cosmodrome (on Russian territory). The Soviet counterpart to GPS, GLONASS, fell into disrepair and was unreliable by the turn of the millennium. After Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999 and the Russian economy began to stabilise in the 2000s, the VKS-VS again began to expand and update its military space presence, relaunching the GLONASS system, developing the Persona reconnaissance satellites with sub-meter resolutions and SIGINT systems were updated with the Lotos-S and Pion-NKS platforms. The Soviet Union had developed a capability the US never tested in the form of a co-orbital anti-satellite platform called the Istrebitel Sputnikov which would launch a projectile towards a target. Although it was retired in the 1980s, a follow-up satellite with a directed laser weapon (Polyus-Skif) was launched in 1987 but failed. In 2015, the Russian military was restructured and the VKS-VS was folded back into the Russian Aerospace Forces, the VKS. Russia began testing anti-satellite capabilities again in throughout the 2010s and 2020s. The Kosmos 2542 and 2543 satellites are maneuverable, capable of approaching other objects in orbit, which they did to a US military satellite in 2020. Additionally, the ground-based Tirada-2S system is designed to jam satellites, while forces operating in combat zones can use a vehicle-mounted Krasukha-4 radio-frequency jamming system that can disrupt airborne radar, aircraft datalinks, and satellite-based radar imaging systems, or the Borisoglebsk-2 radio and GPS jammer. Among the most worrying Russian anti-satellite capabilities is the Nudol (PL-19), a ground-based missile which demonstrated its capabilities by destroying the Russian Cosmos 1408 in November 2021. The Cosmos 2553 satellite, assessed to be part of project to develop Russian nuclear weapons in space, which was launched in 2022, suffered a problem in 2025 meaning it is potentially no longer functional, showcasing that despite Russia’s significant military assets in space, it is still a difficult environment to operate in. With Russian defense spending now focused on the war in Ukraine, and the necessity to replace many land and air assets lost due to Ukrainian forces, Russia’s space program is not the principal threat to US orbital supremecy, although its legacy platforms are still of concern.
In addition to the enduring Russian threat to US space assets, China has significantly advanced its military space presence and anti-satellite capabilities. As part of Xi Jinping’s sweeping reforms of the Chinese armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) was established in 2015 alongside the PLA Rocket Force. Tasked with overseeing space, cyber, and electronic warfare, the PLASSF marked China’s first major step toward integrating space operations into its broader military doctrine. As China’s capacity to project power in orbit has grown and space assets have become foundational to PLA joint operations, the PLASSF was reorganized in 2024, leading to the creation of the PLA Aerospace Force, a direct competitor to the US Space Force. China’s civilian space sector also continues to expand, with the China National Space Administration and commercial partners completing 68 launches in 2024, the majority of which support dual-use or military missions. Coordinated by the PLA Aerospace Force, Chinese orbital presence is approaching American levels. The Yaogan series, now numbering over 60 satellites, provides a mix of optical imaging, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic intelligence, enabling persistent surveillance and precision targeting across key theaters. This has been reinforced by the launch of the Hongtu-1 (PIESAT-1) constellation in 2023, which delivers high-resolution X-band SAR imagery under all weather conditions. On the communications front, the PLA has expanded the Tianlian data relay system and deployed secure military satellites, such as Zhongxing-18A, enabling real-time command and control across the full range of China’s military operations.
Meanwhile, China’s ASAT capabilities have evolved from crude demonstrations to sophisticated, dual-use systems. The 2007 SC-19 test, in which a modified DF-21 missile destroyed a defunct Chinese weather satellite, remains the most visible example of kinetic ASAT use, but tests of the SC-19 have continued, and a suspected test occurred in 2023. SC-19s are launched by the PLARF. China has also tested interceptor missiles, the Dong Neng-2 and 3, designed for ballistic missile defense, in ASAT roles. Kinetic ASAT is suboptimal due to the debris it creates and the potential to disrupt a force's own assets. More recent Chinese programs suggest exploration of non-destructive, co-orbital techniques. The Shijian-21, launched in 2021, used a robotic arm to reposition a satellite to graveyard orbit, demonstrating active maneuvering and satellite capture abilities under the pretext of debris removal, but it is also assessed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency to have potential co-orbital jamming and spoofing capabilities, allowing them to interfere with satellite communications, navigation, or data relays. These platforms may also be equipped to deploy directed electronic attacks against other satellites, either by directly targeting their sensors or by disrupting their uplinks and downlinks. Just as satellites can receive and transmit information from the ground, they can also be used to amplify cyber and EW attacks launched from Earth, extending their reach and reducing the risk of detection or attribution. Chinese military planners appear to be constructing a “kill mesh”, a layered and redundant network of reconnaissance satellites, early warning sensors, command links, and potential ASAT platforms that can rapidly detect, track, and engage targets in orbit. This architecture reflects a shift toward automated, decentralized space warfare, positioning China to challenge US freedom of action in orbit through pre-positioned assets, distributed ISR, and denial mechanisms. While the Cold War Soviet threat never required a standalone service to counter it, satellites are now fundamental to US military power, and with the threat from the Russian VKS and PLAAF, the 2019 decision to establish the US Space Force looks to be justified.
A Chinese state media image of a DF-11 ballistic missile armed with what may be a Dong Neng-series anti-satellite weapon.
The US Space Force
The 2007 Chinese destruction of a satellite led to the creation of the Allard Commission, which recommended the enhancement of US abilities to protect its own satellites, but it took until 2017 for members of Congress to propose the creation of a Space Corps within the Air Force. This proposal failed, but President Trump endorsed the Space Force in 2018 and with his support, in 2019 the US Space Force was established as the sixth American military service, but under the administration of the Department of the Air Force, akin to the US Marine Corps being a separate service as a part of the Department of the Navy.
In 2025, the USSF has a budget for the fiscal year of $29.4 billion. It currently consists of 9400 active duty “Guardians”, a term linked to the motto of Air Force Space Command, and around 5000 civilian personnel, but does not currently have a national guard or reserve element. It is led by the Chief of Space Operations, a four-star general who sits on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, which since 2021 has been General B. Chance Saltzman, who was commanding the 1st Expeditionary Space Control Squadron in 2007 at the time of the Chinese SC-19 missile test. The USSF is organised into Field Commands, which manage major mission areas and coordinate with other US military branches and federal agencies. Below them are Deltas, equivalent to a USAF Wing or US Army Brigade who will be responsible for distinct operational functions such as missile warning, satellite communications, or orbital warfare, and Squadrons which are equivalent to a USAF Squadron or US Army Battalion which tend to have specific control of assets, such as the 2nd Space Operations Squadron (2 SOPS) who operate GPS, or the 18th Space Defense Squadron who are responsible for detecting, tracking, and characterizing all man-made objects in Earth orbit.
U.S. Space Force Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman with a freshly graduated Guardian in October 2024.
As a separate service, the USSF has its own uniforms, logo, flag, and doctrine. While on operations, USSF personnel wear combat fatigues similar to USAF personnel, but their dress uniform, used for ceremonial occasions and logo was widely mocked when it appeared, as it was seen as too futuristic and derivative of fictional militarized space forces. However, the creator of Star Trek said that he drew inspiration for the logo of fictional Starfleet from the logo of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division in 1962, which had adopted the delta symbol from the U.S. Army Air Forces, who used it as early as 1942. The USSF warfighting doctrine is built around three pillars: maintaining domain awareness, protecting and defending assets through non-kinetic and maneuver options, and ensuring the ability to rapidly reconstitute capabilities in a contested environment. Rather than seeking dominance through offense alone, the USSF focuses on denying adversaries the ability to gain a strategic advantage in orbit.
The USSF inherited personnel from existing military services, principally the USAF, although it has now started its own recruitment program. While the US Army, Navy and Air Force offer a route for prospective officers via their respective military academies at West Point, Annapolis and USAF Academy Colorado, the USSF draws officers from the USAF Academy like the USMC recruits some officers from Annapolis. The current officer ratio in the USSF is much higher than in other services, being roughly equal in terms of officers (4,576) to enlisted personnel (4,924). Women are not restricted from holding any role in the USSF, and currently make up 19% of the total.
Upon its establishment, the USSF assumed control of a wide array of satellite and ground-based systems critical to US military operations, but not all. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) retains full operational authority over the United States’ most sensitive intelligence satellites, including those for electro-optical imagery, radar surveillance, and signals intelligence. The Army and Navy continue to operate certain tactical satellite terminals and user equipment, such as ground-based communications nodes and GPS receivers integrated into field units and naval platforms. The Missile Defense Agency also controls several space-based sensors for tracking ballistic and hypersonic threats, which support national missile defense but are not subordinated to the USSF. However, the USSF now controls the majority of US space assets including the most important platforms. In the area of reconnaissance and space domain awareness, it took over the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), a fleet of maneuverable satellites in geostationary orbit used to monitor and inspect foreign space objects, as well as the Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite in low Earth orbit and the Space Surveillance Network, which integrates ground-based radars to track tens of thousands of objects across all orbital regimes. For communications, the USSF inherited control of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) constellation of six secure, nuclear-hardened satellites in GEO; the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and legacy Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) fleets for high-capacity X-band and Ka-band voice and data services; and the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), a narrowband UHF constellation originally developed by the Navy, which enables secure mobile connectivity for tactical units. In early warning and missile detection, the Space Force assumed responsibility for the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a constellation of satellites in both geosynchronous and highly elliptical orbits that detect ballistic and cruise missile launches using advanced infrared sensors, as well as key ground-based radar arrays like PAVE PAWS and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). Finally, in the domain of positioning, navigation, and timing, the USSF took operational command of the Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation in medium Earth orbit, currently composed of GPS IIR, IIF, and the modernized GPS III satellites, providing critical navigational services to both US forces and billions of civilian users worldwide.
A 6000kg Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite at 22,300 miles high in orbit.
This fleet of satellites is worth tens of billions of dollars in the platforms alone. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, cost over $15 billion. More important than the cost is the utility these systems provide. AEHF is vital to the US nuclear deterrent, as it is one method of communicating Emergency Action Messages to Ohio-class nuclear ballistic submarines in the event of the President authorizing a strategic nuclear strike, and enables the continued coordination of a nuclear response in a nuclear war. US precision strikes are the core method of the American way of war. Surgically striking an adversary's command and control, air defense sites, logistics, and troop formations allows the US armed forces to systematically take apart the enemy's ability to fight. Russia, China and Iran have invested tens of billions in air defenses to blunt this capability, which cannot be delivered without GPS providing the precise timing and geolocation data necessary for long-range cruise missiles like the Tomahawk, air-launched munitions such as JDAMs, and navigation systems onboard F-35s, B-2s, ships, and drones to function. The GPS costs $2 billion a year in operations and maintenance, but upgraded versions which are more resistant to potential Russian and Chines interference (GPS III satellites are currently being deployed to orbit by Space X and United Launch Alliance, a Boeing/Lockheed collaboration, and the more advanced GPS IIIF is due to begin deployment in 2027) are expected to cost over $9 billion. The minimum requirement for GPS to function is 24 satellites, and although 31 are operational, approximately 20,200 kilometers (12,550 miles) high in orbit, they are still vulnerable to kinetic ASAT strikes. If the number of GPS platforms fell below 24, the ability of the US to deliver precision strikes would be significantly impacted.
Space is not a territory where allies can operate independently from geographically distinct locations. While US and allies can coordinate on monitoring and situational awareness, only the USSF possesses the ability to conduct meaningful military operations in orbit. The Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO), originally a Five Eyes (the intelligence-sharing alliance) project that started in 2014, links the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (later joined by France, Germany, and Japan in 2019) in sharing space situational awareness, coordinating responses to space threats, and aligning national space strategies. However, it is not a warfighting coalition like NATO’s integrated air and naval commands. CSpO ensures that attacks on satellites or ground facilities can be rapidly detected, attributed, and responded to collectively at the political level, but if the United States chose to act in orbit, it would do so alone. Taiwan and South Korea are not formal participants in CSpO, although they cooperate closely with US Indo-Pacific Command and receive space-based intelligence and early warning data. In the event of a war with China, Taiwan would likely receive far greater access to US space intelligence, just as Ukraine has during its conflict with Russia.
How the USSF Plans to Win in Orbit
The United States Space Force faces a rapidly evolving threat environment. Chinese and Russian forces can now target American satellites with ground-based missiles, electronic attacks, and co-orbital threats. Rather than relying on direct retaliation, the USSF emphasizes resilience, redundancy, and active defense. Against kinetic attacks, the USSF is investing heavily in dispersing its capabilities across hundreds of satellites, rather than concentrating them in a few vulnerable assets. Networks like the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) aim to ensure that no single loss cripples US space-based capabilities. Satellites are maneuverable and can shift orbits in response to threats detected by tracking systems like GSSAP and SBSS.
In the electromagnetic domain, the USSF counters jamming and electronic attacks through hardened communications satellites like AEHF and through flexible response units such as the 16th Electromagnetic Warfare Squadron. Tools like RAIDRS and mobile remote terminals allow the US to rapidly locate and disrupt adversary jamming efforts. In cyberspace, the USSF has adopted a Zero Trust model, assuming that attacks will breach some defenses and focusing on continuous authentication, rapid isolation of compromised systems, and active countermeasures. The Moonlighter CubeSat enables Guardians to practice cyber defense tactics in live orbital conditions.
The USSF has also prioritized non-kinetic offensive options. Directed energy systems under development may allow the dazzling or blinding of enemy satellites without creating dangerous debris. New maneuverable satellites, some designed by firms like VC-funded True Anomaly, are expected to shadow, inspect, or interfere with adversary space assets in close proximity operations. True Anomaly’s Jackal Autonomous Orbital Vehicle, if successful, could allow the USSF to field hundreds of units. Although the US banned ASAT tests in 2022, like its ability to restart nuclear weapons testing, it maintains direct-ascent ASAT missiles (variants of the SM-3 missile) and could theoretically use nuclear EMP attacks in space. However, these options are politically and strategically undesirable. Instead, the USSF doctrine stresses “fighting through” a degraded space environment, rapidly launching replacements, and denying the adversary a clean strategic victory in orbit.
A USSF X-37B in November 2022.
The USSF operates two X-37B Orbital Test Vehicles, reusable unmanned spacecraft built by Boeing that resemble small space shuttles. These vehicles have completed seven missions to date, with the most recent one lasting 434 days in orbit and returning in March 2025. Their exact missions are classified, but they are known to test satellite technologies, sensors, and potentially explore on-orbit servicing and surveillance roles in low and high earth orbit. Since its inception in 1999 and its first flight in 2010, the program has cost $2 billion, but has yielded massive amounts of information for future spacecraft development (the latest deployment saw the craft avoid over 1.7 potential collisions). Future developments include the possibility of a larger version or additional vehicles optimized for rapid deployment of small satellites or non-kinetic counterspace operations. China has also developed its own version of a reusable spaceplane, the Shenlong, conducting a classified mission in 2022, which demonstrates a clear interest in matching US capabilities in orbital maneuver and rapid deployment platforms. It is extremely unlikely, given the deadly operating environment of space, the high costs of deploying heavy payloads to space, and increasingly sophisticated robotics and AI systems, that humans will be fighting in spacecraft for the next few decades.
Space Industrial Base and Procurement Challenges
Although the US military retains a technological advantage over its potential peer competitors, its major weakness is sustaining high-intensity operations with expensive precision strike weapons and successfully intercepting enough enemy attacks to maintain viable forces. The US would run out of long-range anti-ship missiles within a week of engaging with the PLAN and exhaust its supplies of long-range air-launched ground attack missiles within a month. To defend against Houthi missile attacks on an arguably noncritical mission, the USN fired 200 SM2 ($.25 million a shot) and SM6 ($5 million) air defense missiles from October 2023-January 2025, supplies which will take years to rebuild as delivery from contracts being awarded takes a minimum of 18 months. The US military industrial base’s ability to produce complex weapons, despite receiving more funding to address the issue, is much weaker than China’s, which can produce thousands of missiles a year at significantly lower costs.
For the USSF, however, the playing field between the American and Chinese industrial bases is tilted firmly in the US’s favour. The US possesses the largest and most advanced space industry in the world, with multiple world-leading companies that outperform competitors on cost, reliability, and technical sophistication, contributing 0.5% of US GDP, or $143 billion in 2024. The USSF does not require constant resupply of munitions to deliver its core missions of protecting US satellites and communications, and its ability to deliver assets to orbit using SpaceX, United Launch Alliance (ULA) and Blue Origin is robust. The healthy US space industry offers resilience in the form of multiple supply chains, high reliability rates (ULA, used for more sensitive military missions, has a 100% success rate) and lower costs, as SpaceX’s Falcon 9 reusable rocket can launch heavier payloads for $64 million compared to a Long March 3 single use mission costing $70-$90 million. Having access to a variety of launch options also allows more flexibility and in the event of a satellite being disabled, perhaps due to an accident, the USSF could conceivably get a replacement into orbit within three weeks, with most of that time preparing the payload if there was a satellite ready to go rather than waiting for an available launch. China would struggle to do a similar option in any time less than eight weeks, due to fewer available rockets and launch pads. SpaceX and Blue Origin's ambitions to achieve interplanetary travel also means that private development of orbital logistics and necessary life support systems will have spillover benefits for the potential development of rapid logistical and troop deployment. The venture capital-backed explosion of defense start-ups (defense VC funding doubled from 2019-2022) since 2022 has been most successful in delivering newer technologies, such as AI-integrated platforms, better software for logistics, and space assets. Larger defense companies often struggle to make money from smaller systems and slower innovation cycles, while these emerging sectors have been ripe for disruption. In contrast, Chinese military technology development remains dominated by state-owned enterprises, lacking the commercial dynamism characteristic of American capitalism.
Satellite construction requires extreme precision, advanced components, and proficient designers and engineers. The United States maintains by far the largest satellite fleet in the world, with more than triple the combined total of China and Russia, underpinned by its dominant commercial and military space industries. American spacepower draws upon a uniquely deep, competitive, and specialized commercial satellite sector. Dozens of US companies design and manufacture satellites across all mission types, from large geostationary platforms to swarms of small LEO systems which can be produced for under $5 million. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman compete to build secure and hardened military platforms. Maxar Technologies and L3Harris specialize in high-resolution Earth observation and imagery satellites and SpaceX, Planet, and Amazon’s Project Kuiper are building entire broadband constellations. Although not all of these platforms have strictly military applications, the workforce provides not just a deeper technical advantage but also potential reserve forces for the USSF. As the US space industry grows and drives down the costs of commercial satellites, the USSF is seeking cheaper yet more capable platforms, an enviable position for other services that have to purchase incredibly expensive munitions, ships, fighter jets, and tanks. The deployment of the Starlink network, which now has over 4000 satellites, has spurred the development of Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, a USSF network of 150 multifunctional satellites that cost $15 million each, including launch, which is due to expand by 200 satellites in 2026 and could reach over 1000 by the end of the decade. Compared to previous satellite networks, which tended to have a single function, were far less numerous (there are only 31 operational GPS satellites in orbit) and cost up to 100 times that of a PWSA platform, this modern system is less resistant to Chinese jamming or attempts to shoot platforms down just because its sheer size.
How can its capabilities be further enhanced?
While the USSF’s current forces are formidable, a future conflict against a peer adversary like China would demand even greater resilience, reach and responsiveness. The USSF’s current arrangements with companies like SpaceX, United Launch Alliance, and Northrop Grumman mean that satellites can be prepared and launched within weeks, much faster than China’s current capacity. However, a truly “tactically responsive” launch, meaning a payload delivered to orbit within 24 to 72 hours of order, remains a work in progress. USSF programs like Victus Nox and Victus Haze are experimenting with achieving this capability. SpaceX, although highly capable, has obligations to other customers and is unlikely to prioritize a military launch in peacetime without significant contractual restructuring. The Department of Defense and DARPA have estimated that establishing a fully dedicated, tactically responsive launch capability (with standby rockets, permanent ground crews, rapid payload integration facilities, and secure military launch control) would cost between $2 and $3 billion, even if based at existing facilities such as Vandenberg Space Force Base.
One of the weaker elements of the USSF today is active defense against adversary satellites. While surveillance and resilience measures have improved, the ability to intercept or neutralize hostile space objects remains limited. The space industrial base is, however, providing new options. Rocket Lab, Starfish, Anduril/Impulse Space and True Anomaly are developing maneuverable “space drones” equipped with robotic arms, cameras, and potentially electronic warfare payloads. These drones would be able to approach, inspect, and, if necessary, disable adversary satellites without resorting to kinetic explosions that create debris fields. The USSF has awarded early contracts to companies such as Rocket Lab for the Victus Haze initiative (aiming for operational prototypes by 2026–2027), and Starfish, which received a $37.5 million contract for its Otter satellite servicing vehicle.
One potential future capability, far more visible and politically resonant, would be the adoption of suborbital rocket transport for logistics or military personnel. Logistics has always been a decisive factor in military operations. American military power depends on the logistical proficiency of the US Navy, the Merchant Marine, and the USAF with its fleets of C-17 and C-5 aircraft. In a major conflict, US civilian airlines can also be requisitioned to transport troops and materiel under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet system. The USAF, rather than the USSF, is leading the early development of RocketCargo concepts using SpaceX’s Starship or similar heavy lift vehicles. The initial focus is on logistics rather than troop transport, but with sufficient funding, a dedicated life support system could be developed to carry around 150 troops with a configuration larger than commercial airline economy seats across intercontinental distances. Developing a robust life support and re-entry module for Starship could cost $2 to $3 billion, as such an upgrade would align with SpaceX’s ambitions for Mars transport, where long-duration human survival systems are essential.
In a crisis, a Starship configured for military transport could deliver a company-sized force and their equipment to Taiwan from bases in Texas in around 90 minutes, potentially bypassing blockades or bottlenecks in the Pacific. Each suborbital mission may cost $10 to $20 million based on what SpaceX aims for Starship orbital missions. This is surprisingly close to the full cost of operating multiple C-17 sorties for a similar logistics payload, given that C-17s cost approximately $207,000 per flight hour including fuel, depreciation, maintenance, crew, training, parts, overhaul, and indirect support costs. Even flying from US bases closer to a potential conflict zone does not meaningfully reduce the overall cost of munitions or troop transport, because supplies still must be delivered across the Pacific from the continental United States. The larger C-5 Galaxy transport costs around $109,000 per flight hour but still takes 12 to 14 hours to fly from the United States to Taiwan, and flying into a contested zone carries significant risk of interception by enemy fighters or ship-based air defenses. The C-5 is also not typically used for aerial delivery of cargo. The USAF primarily uses C-130 transport aircraft for airdropped resupply missions, but these platforms are unsuitable for transporting large and complex systems, such as replacement air defense missiles. During the Vietnam War, US forces lost one C-130 and three C-123 aircraft to enemy fire during the resupply of Khe Sanh, with many more damaged. As a result, the United States does not conduct transport flights into active conflict zones without first heavily suppressing enemy air defenses, but in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, this would mean fending off hundreds of J-36 and J-20 fighters and avoiding hundreds of PLAN ships with surface-to-air missiles. Although landing a Starship in an active warzone would present significant risks and is currently not designed to relaunch without launch infrastructure, it could plausibly land in an emergency. While Taiwan does not currently have the launch infrastructure to support high-tempo Starship operations, even limited one-way missions could provide rapid reinforcement when conventional airlift options would be too slow or too vulnerable. While RocketCargo, or another mainly privately developed suborbital transport system would not replace traditional strategic airlift, it could offer unparalleled speed and flexibility for critical missions where minutes or hours matter. It would also expand the USSF’s mission set into logistical support for rapid reinforcement, making the service more central to any future high-intensity conflict.
A Starship booster before being caught by the Mechzilla in Texas. Future rapid USSF/USAF logistical operations may look closer to this than aircraft landing at airfields.
While the USSF currently focuses primarily on operations within Earth orbit, the rise of Chinese ambitions to establish a presence on the Moon and beyond is pushing the US to extend its surveillance envelope. The planned Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability will allow continuous monitoring of spacecraft out to cislunar distances. China has announced plans for a permanent lunar research base in partnership with Russia, which could in the future present new security concerns. Future missions to the Moon and Mars under NASA’s Artemis Program will rely on USSF support for communications, navigation, and domain awareness. Although there are no current plans for Space Force personnel to deploy to the lunar surface, protecting critical infrastructure like lunar communication relays or refueling depots could eventually require a limited security presence in space or even on the Moon itself.
Conclusion
Without the protection and resilience of space-based assets, the precision, speed, and global reach that define the American way of war would erode under the pressure of emerging peer threats. The USSF’s essential role is vastly disproportionate to its public presence. While the USSF faces real challenges, from adversaries’ growing counterspace capabilities to the need for faster launch cycles and more active orbital defenses, it enjoys structural advantages that no competitor can easily replicate. America’s deep and innovative space industrial base, unmatched commercial partnerships, and technological supremacy should allow the USSF to continue protecting the United States’ orbital infrastructure, upon which American military power depends.
Post Script - USSF at war in 2032.
A peer-on-peer conflict between the United States and China remains a remote but realistic possibility. Although Xi Jinping had declared that the PLA must be ready for such a conflict by 2027 and the PLA Rocket Force has exceeded expectations, the PLAAF, PLAN, and PLA were still some years from being ready to undertake a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. As capabilities on all sides grew, the following is a fictional, narrative description of how the USSF may be central to the defense of Taiwan in 2032.
After the death of Xi Jinping and the unexpected rise of now-President Han Wuwei, the People’s Republic of China began matching increasingly militant rhetoric with massive military drills, the mobilization of reserve forces, and the deployment of naval task groups encircling Taiwan. This did not resemble April 2021, when the Russian armed forces deployed hundreds of thousands of men to the border of Ukraine, but more closely mirrored January 2022. The USSF’s network of 1,200 PWSA satellites monitored a significant Chinese logistical buildup at the ports of Xiamen, Zhangzhou, and Fuzhou. These ports were crowded with dual-use ferries and commercial RO-RO vessels loading amphibious assault vehicles, tanks, and troop carriers. Naval vessels from the PLAN formed up in disciplined lines just offshore. Infrared and synthetic aperture radar platforms confirmed constant movement.
Coordinating with the National Reconnaissance Office, USSF analysts integrated optical, radar, and electronic intelligence into a comprehensive space-based operating picture, adding additional vital information that an attack on Taiwan was imminent. At Fort Meade, USCYBERCOM teams deployed hardened uplink and downlink protocols in anticipation of cyber and electromagnetic interference. The United States had been flying additional defensive systems into Taiwan with C-17 and C-5 transport planes. However, with PLAAF J-36 fighters flying aggressive combat air patrols just in and outside Taiwanese airspace, the risk of losing a USAF transport had grown dangerously high. Even with GPS IIIF guiding USAF pilots on erratic and low-flying missions, any further supplies could only be delivered by USSF-coordinated suborbital flights, which the President remained uncertain about deploying. Delivery by rocket cargo required a political leap.
Meanwhile, USSF satellites engaged in constant maneuvering with PLA Aerospace Force’s Shijian-27 units, which began shadowing US platforms in an apparent attempt to interfere with orbital trajectories and sensor integrity. The USSF’s regular deployment of new satellites ensured that American operations were not disrupted. As a precaution, the USSF launched X-37B vessels and AI-assisted counterspace drones to protect critical legacy platforms.
On the night of August 15, the USSF detected frenzied Chinese activity via orbital SIGINT and reconnaissance. It did not appear that the activity was directed against US assets in the Pacific, but Chinese satellites moved to disable Taiwanese military satellites while PLARF rockets unleashed a hail of devastating attacks on Taiwanese air defense systems, runways, military bases, and command and control nodes. Although not a critical military installation, the Taiwanese Presidential Palace was left in ruins.
The USSF coordinated a staggering volume of military traffic. The US 7th Fleet was already at sea, and additional carrier strike groups were making their way across the Pacific, while USAF E-3 Sentry planes relayed information on the changing course of the Fujian carrier group. F-35 fighters scrambled to provide air defense for their bases in Guam, Japan, and Korea. The Chinese invasion fleet, now assembling across the Taiwan Strait, would take perhaps a day to cross. China had not yet engaged US forces, and although the President was fully aware of the implications of a war with China, he refused to allow US forces to strike until China made the first move.
China, in the event, did not take long. The USSF detected the launch of SC-19 missiles, identifying the unit through its long-standing surveillance. The missiles headed toward orbit. Simultaneously, Chinese space-based jammers unleashed electromagnetic attacks against US military satellites, and the war between China and the United States began in space. The USSF maneuvered satellites it assessed to be in danger and redirected drone decoys toward the missiles’ projected destinations. USSF offensive counterspace deltas controlling drones equipped with directed laser weapons received permission to engage their Chinese counterparts. Other deltas initiated their own electronic warfare and cyberattacks on Chinese orbital and ground-based space units.
The SC-19 missiles did succeed in hitting some US satellites, but the redundancy of having hundreds of spare satellites already in orbit paid off. As the war in space intensified, the USSF had blunted the attack and emerged in a stronger position. US forces back on Earth now prepared to fight. B-2 Spirit bombers on high alert took off from bases in the Pacific. US nuclear submarines carrying Tomahawk missiles prepared to fire at targets in mainland China. F-35 fighters launched missions to destroy Chinese air defenses. None of this would have been possible had the USSF failed to protect American space assets.
The President now decided, with war underway, to deploy US special forces to Taiwan to boost the morale of Taiwanese army units and to signal that more help would be on the way. Only by using USSF suborbital transport could they get there safely and quickly. From the order going out to Naval Special Warfare Group One to landing in Taiwan took only one hour and fifteen minutes. Although the eventual victor remained uncertain, the USSF had survived the opening stages of the war and ensured that the United States would be able to continue the fight.