MBDA - Complex Weapons Systems

MBDA builds Europe’s most advanced missiles, but can Europe really wage war without America’s military and industrial might?

An MBDA beyond-visual-range air-to-air Meteor missile.

In the decades following the Cold War, most European nations allowed their defense industries to atrophy. Declining military budgets, deindustrialization, and a growing dependence on American security guarantees eroded Europe’s capacity to wage high-intensity warfare. The war in Ukraine has exposed the consequences: European missile stockpiles have been depleted by arms transfers, while the US’s growing strategic focus on deterring China in the Pacific raises the possibility that Europe may one day have to fight without guaranteed access to American munitions, airpower, logistics, or intelligence. A complete transatlantic rupture remains unlikely, but Europe’s ability to sustain a major conflict without direct US military support is uncertain.

At the heart of NATO and Western military doctrine is the assumption that allied forces will achieve air supremacy early in a conflict, enabling the systematic destruction of enemy air defenses, command infrastructure, and logistics nodes. That strategy depends on access to large quantities of advanced, precision-guided munitions launched from aircraft, ships, and mobile ground platforms, and on the ability to defend against ballistic missile and drone attacks in return.

Europe’s ability to field such weapons at scale will be decisive in any future war with a peer adversary. At the centre of that challenge is MBDA, Europe’s leading missile manufacturer and a consortium jointly owned by Airbus, BAE Systems, and Leonardo. MBDA produces the complex missile systems that many European aircraft, warships, and ground-based air defenses use. However, the question remains: Can MBDA and Europe’s fragmented defense industry replace American munitions' current role more broadly?

What is MBDA?

MBDA is Europe’s largest missile manufacturer, reporting $5.46 billion in revenue in 2024 with an order backlog exceeding $40 billion, reflecting the rising demand for European-made precision weapons off the back of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and concerns about American commitments to European defense. The company was established in 2001 through the merger of Matra BAe Dynamics (France/UK), Alenia Marconi Systems (Italy/UK), and Aerospatiale-Matra Missiles (France), consolidating Europe’s fragmented missile industry into a single multinational entity. Today, MBDA employs over 18,000 people across production and research facilities in France, the UK, Italy, Germany, and Spain.

The company is jointly owned by Airbus Defence and Space (France/Germany - 37.5%), BAE Systems (UK - 37.5%), and Leonardo (Italy - 25%), making it a multinational consortium rather than a vertically integrated company like Lockheed Martin or Raytheon. It does not release its own annual report or financial statements. Traditionally, the chair is always from BAE Systems and the chief executive is always French, with current CEO, Eric Béranger, taking up his position in 2019. The company saw a renewed push towards cooperation between the two largest national shareholders, Britain and France, in the wake of the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties, which was mainly aimed at eliminating duplicate efforts and costs, but has also resulted in the helicopter fired Sea Venom missile and the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) program.

Unlike its American counterparts, MBDA’s decision-making is shaped by the influence of its three parent companies and the differing strategic priorities of their respective governments. The UK has historically pushed for its missiles to be integrated with American-built fighters such as the F-35 and ground-based missile systems to maintain interoperability with the US military. France has pursued a sovereign missile manufacturing capability, ensuring that domestically built fighter jets, warships, and air defense systems remain independent of non-European suppliers. Despite being a key industrial player in MBDA, Germany has blocked the export of missiles to countries such as Saudi Arabia, leading to political tensions within the consortium, particularly with France, which relies heavily on arms exports as part of its defense industrial strategy. The company has separate accounts for each respective national component, allowing for national priorities to be addressed, but it does not separate the company's supply chains to mean one country can manufacture all the parts domestically for a missile.

While MBDA primarily produces advanced weaponry for European-built military assets, it has also expanded its exports to nations such as the UAE and India. MBDA has been working to expand production capacity at sites in Bolton (in the UK, where the manufacturing capacity is set to double), Venette (France), and Schrobenhausen (Germany) and adjust to a broad European procurement policy of only buying missiles for a “just on time” procurement policy to one focused on replacing stocks sent to Ukraine and building up stockpiles to make sure there are enough to deter any further Russian aggression against European nations.

The location of MBDA’s facilities reflects its longer-term commitment to a “Western European” capability to produce complex weapons rather than a purely sovereign capability. In the Storm Shadow missile, for example, the servo controller and controlling systems come from MBDA France, whereas the internal cabling comes from MBDA UK, the engine from Safran (a French company), and the warhead from BAE Systems. MBDA cannot function as a fully sovereign national supplier for any one country, meaning no single state can independently scale production in wartime. A further example of MBDA’s intentionally diverse supply chain is MBDA UK, which is responsible for the actuators and data link technology, while France delivers the control systems and testing equipment for the missiles. Although France procures all of its missiles for its military from MBDA, it still relies on parts from MBDA UK and Italy.

On paper, MBDA’s finances appear strong. While this reflects surging demand from European militaries, the backlog also highlights the limitations of Europe’s existing missile production base. These orders will take years to fulfill. Even with new investment, delivery timelines for complex systems like the ASTER 30 will still be 18 months by 2026, and the skilled workforce needed to expand production is finite.

A Storm Shadow/SCALP air-launched cruise missile.

The Limits of Europe’s Independent Warfighting Strategy

NATO’s war plans assume that any conflict with a peer adversary (most likely Russia) would be fought alongside the United States and aim to achieve air supremacy to enable the destruction of enemy forces. This model worked spectacularly well in the first and second invasions of Iraq, and Russia’s inability to do this in invading Ukraine shows that even with significant military forces and modern weapons, a conflict can quickly descend into a brutal attritional war. In NATO's war plans, the US provides stealth airpower, long-range strike munitions, satellite intelligence, and strategic lift capacity from the get-go to help win control of the air. In a war with NATO in which US forces joined the fight, F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters equipped with anti-radiation and long-range air-to-ground missiles would seek to find and destroy Russian air defense and command and control systems, freeing up fourth-generation Eurofighter and F-16 jets to execute more strikes on Russian logistical elements and formations.

In an outbreak of war between European countries and Russia in which the US refuses or is unable to commit to a European war, perhaps because it is fighting to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion, the odds that Russia is able to contest air supremacy become much more likely. European air forces do not have anywhere near the number or quality of US Intelligence, Signals, and Reconnaissance assets (ISR). European air forces have only three major signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft in the form of the British Royal Air Force's Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joint, used to monitor an adversary's electronic emissions and communications, which are a vital part in finding enemy assets before attacks can be made on them. However, the information these aircraft gather cannot be analysed without sending the data to the USAF, meaning the actual capabilities of European SIGINT analysis are negligible.

If European NATO countries are not granted intelligence sharing from US satellites, they do have their own comparable programs, but they are not as high-quality or comprehensive. European Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Observation (MUSIS) has a 20cm resolution compared to the US National Reconnaissance Office's KH-series satellites 10cm, and has only limited infrared surveillance and signals reconnaissance capabilities. Although the EU’s Galileo system has better accuracy than GPS for civilian use, Military GPS III has a comparable accuracy. The US has several private companies, such as SpaceX, which can offer alternative comprehensive coverage or step in if satellites are shot down or disabled. As things currently stand, the UK has not had access to Galileo since leaving the EU in 2016.

European NATO countries do have respectable air-to-air refueling capabilities, with 44 mainly A330 MRTT tankers, which offer superior fuel efficiency, simultaneous refueling, and longer range than the 12-15 permanently based US KC-135R Stratotankers based at RAF Mildenhall in the UK, but their strategic lift cpabilities, essential for rapidly moving troops, munitions and support elements is deficient. European nations have a collective 126 A400M strategic lift vehicles with a payload capacity of 37 tons compared to 222 C-17A (77.5 tons) and 52 C-5M (127 tons) aircraft operated by the USAF. This matters in the scenario whereby European countries find themselves in a conflict with Russia, the faster weapons, troops, and support units can be moved to areas where they are needed, the greater the chances are of repulsing any attack. European nations are not totally disarmed and do have significant logistics and intelligence abilities, but it is questionable if these, without US support, are enough to deter or win a future conflict. When European forces can reach the battlefield, they will still depend on American weapons and munitions to sustain the fight.

That reliance becomes most acute in the area of advanced munitions, particularly the precision-guided weapons that underpin Western warfighting doctrine. At the centre of this challenge lies MBDA, Europe’s leading complex weapons manufacturer and the only European entity capable of producing a suite of air-to-air, air-to-ground, naval, and ground-launched missile systems for European forces.

Can MBDA’s Arsenal Deliver in a Peer Conflict?

To gain and maintain air superiority, European air forces require long-range air-to-air missiles capable of engaging enemy aircraft before they are detected or targeted. MBDA’s Meteor missile is the centrepiece of this capability. In performance terms, it exceeds its US equivalents, and costs around $2.6 million (depending on the number ordered). Meteor can hit enemy aircraft from up to 300km, but when fired from within 60km, its ramjet propulsion system and active radar seeking system supposedly does not allow a target to escape by maneuvering. This is longer ranged than the comparable US AIM-120D missile, but Meteor is not currently available on F-16 jets flown by Poland, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, or Romania. Meteor can be equipped on F-35 jets that most European air forces are planning to acquire, but it is not as simple as fixing the missile to the plane and firing it when needed. F-35s are designed to fire US manufactured missiles, so to use MBDA’s premier long range missile, software for the F-35 has to be upgraded to the Block 4 package for $14 million, which should not be an issue for countries yet to receive their F-35s but is for those who have already ordered them.

MBDA does not produce medium-range air-to-air missiles for any European air forces aside from France, as this capability is fulfilled by the IRIS-T missile for European Eurofighters or American-made AIM-120 and AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles for F-16s and F-35s. MBDA’s Air-to-Ground and Strike Missiles, which would be used to destroy Russian air defense and command and control systems, include the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG (F-16 and F-35 use Lockheed Martin's Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile) and the Brimstone precision air-to-ground missile. Storm Shadow is simply too large to fit into an F-35's weapon bay, and if it were carried externally, it would seriously compromise the stealth capabilities of the jet, effectively proscribing its use against integrated air defense systems. It has a similar cost to Meteor. The successor to Brimstone is the SPEAR 3 missile, which is planned to work with F-35 but may not be in service until 2028. In 2017, MBDA stated that about 3000 Storm Shadow units had been produced and ordered across nine operator countries, not all of whom (Saudi Arabia, for instance) are European, leaving a stockpile of around 1500 missiles in stockpile to 2017 (once 100 missiles fired in Iraq are accounted for) and a production rate since contracts were first signed in 1997 of 150 a year. However, since 2017, there have not been many large orders from European countries for more Storm Shadow missiles, with only the German Luftwaffe ordering around 250 in 2024. The UK has sent “hundreds” of Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine (possibly in the range of 300), but without US-supplied intelligence, Ukrainian forces cannot use these missiles, highlighting how vital ISR assets are to conducting strikes inside the Russian air defense umbrella.

An AGM-88 HARM being fixed to a USAF F16 in 2021.

Neither MBDA nor any other European missile manufacturer currently produces dedicated anti-radiation missiles (ARMs). Modern air defense systems such as the Russian long-range S-500 and S-400, medium-range Buk-M2/M3, S-350 Vityaz, and short-range Pantsir-S1/S2, Tor-M2 systems are highly capable. They are mobile, capable of detecting incoming strikes, shutting down their radars to evade attack, and employing electronic warfare systems to jam targeting sensors. ARMs, such as the AGM-88 HARM, AGM-88E, and AGM-88G, are designed to counter these defenses. They use passive radar seekers to locate enemy radar emissions without revealing their own position, can home in on jamming signals to neutralize electronic warfare assets, and can store target locations in case the radar shuts down or jamming attempts to disrupt guidance. Western air doctrine assumes up to six ARM missiles per heavily defended air defense target, ideally fired from stealth aircraft to minimize the chance of interception, but the F-35 can fly within Russian air defense zones to locate and target air defenses without ARMs. With the approximate numbers of Russian air defense systems at over 600 medium and long range batteries, to suppress Russian air defenses en masse would require over 1000 missiles in an initial wave of targets and thousands more to continually suppress Russian units that evade destruction.

The air component of European militaries is arguably the strongest. European states' naval and land forces are in varying states of readiness, with some militaries in much worse states than others due to a history of poor procurement, incoherent national strategies, and struggles with recruitment, particularly the British Army and Royal Navy. The only European navy that does not rely on American-made complex weapons for anti-air, anti-ship, and land attack systems is the French Marine Nationale, which sources all but one of its missiles from MBDA. The remaining missile system, the M51 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which carries one arm of the French nuclear deterrent, is sourced from ArianeGroup, a joint venture between Airbus and Safran, the aerospace, defence and security company. The British nuclear deterrent uses the Trident D5II missile, which is built by Lockheed Martin Space.

MBDA offers the MdCN (Missile de Croisière Naval), an equivalent missile to US Tomahawk missiles for use by submarines and frigates, which can attack targets up to 1000km away and costs around $3 million per missile. In a war scenario with Russia, this could be fired from the Barents Sea to attack radar installations and command-and-control centers supporting Russia’s integrated air-defense system, such as those near Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. However, the number of MdCM’s available are only in the region of 350, and in an intensive war, these supplies would soon drop low. As Russia’s navy is much smaller than the combined European NATO powers, the surface component, already in a poor state and damaged by Ukrainian forces, would be unlikely to sail and could be dealt with by air assets using anti ship missiles or naval missile attacks, either delivered by MBDA’s Exocet missile system or American-built Harpoon and LRASM missiles.

The Russian submarine fleet would likely sail to attack shipping, cut electricity interconnectors, sea communications, launch its own cruise missile strikes on lightly defended command and control headquarters or logistics hubs far away from Eastern Europe. Submarine hunting requires coordination between anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets such as frigates, aircraft, and other submarines. MBDA contributes to European ASW capabilities through the MILAS (Missile de Lutte Anti-Sous-marine), a surface-launched anti-submarine missile designed to rapidly deploy a lightweight torpedo near an enemy submarine’s location.

A Royal Navy Daring Class Destroyer firing an ASTER 30 surface-to-air missile.

Defending against Russian air-launched and ballistic missile attacks is something that European navies need to do to protect themselves and extend air defences to land forces operating near coastlines, which could mean defending forces in the Baltics or near Kaliningrad. The ASTER 15, ASTER 30, and VL MICA are MBDA’s primary naval air defense missiles, providing varying levels of protection against aircraft, cruise missiles, and, in the case of ASTER 30, ballistic missile threats. ASTER 15, at over $1 million per missile, can intercept incoming drones, missiles, and aircraft up to a range of 30km, and was most recently used by the Royal Navy to intercept drone attacks from Houthi forces in Yemen. ASTER 30 is a longer-range (120km) and faster interceptor (flying up to Mach 4.5) that MBDA provides to the British, Frenc, and Italian navies. Production rates are not publicly available, but after an order for 700 missiles split between the Italian and French navies, MBDA said they were working to reduce Aster missile production time from 42 months in 2022 to less than 18 months by 2026. Although this order was worth over $1 billion, a Marine Nationale Forbin-class destroyer can carry up to 48 ASTER 15 and 30 missiles, so the stockpile of available missiles is not deep. MBDA also manufactures a shorter-range (20km) VL MICA missile for smaller ships, which, like ASTER 30, is used by the French and Italian armies to offer ground-based air defense.

For medium-range ground-based air defense, ASTER 30 missiles as a part of the SAMP/T system are a credible anti-air and ballistic missile system, but are not widely used by European militaries, who have overwhelmingly opted for Patriot missile systems manufactured by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. Supplies of Patriot interceptor missiles have been stretched thin, not only by the war in Ukraine, but in defending US bases in Iraq from Iranian-backed militia strikes. Despite orders being placed for more missile systems and interceptor missiles by European countries, if a conflict did break out over Taiwan, it is doubtful that orders would be fulfilled given the threat that thousands of PLA Rocket Force missiles pose to Taiwan and US bases in South Korea and Japan. MBDA would require a massive expansion of ASTER 30 missile production to replace the Patriot system, but it currently would be unable to replace the US longer range Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) operated by US Army units currently located in Europe, although it is working on the HYDIS2 (Hypersonic Defense Interceptor Study) program but this is not likely to be in service before the mid 2030s.

Ground-launched missiles, fired by platforms such as the US-produced HIMARS, are another area where European countries are heavily reliant on US supplies. Long-range missiles such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) and ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System), used in Ukraine to target Russian ammunition depots, airfields, and units, currently have no European equivalent. Although MBDA is working on the Joint Fire Support Missile (JFS-M), currently, European variants of the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), which fire these missiles, are tied to Lockheed Martin for resupplies of missiles. Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands have ordered Euro PULS (multiple rocket launcher) systems, manufactured by Israeli company ELBIT Systems, and although some of these systems are being produced in Europe, they do not represent a true sovereign capability for Euro PULS.

MBDA’s portfolio demonstrates that Europe can produce a range of effective missile systems for air, land, and sea operations. However, the availability of these weapons is not simply a matter of funding or design. It ultimately rests on whether the components of high-performance metals, explosives, semiconductors, and subcomponents can be sourced in sufficient quantities and speed. With global supply chains strained, and many critical inputs dependent on foreign or fragile sources, the resilience of Europe’s missile production base is far from guaranteed. The next challenge is not just what Europe builds, but what it can sustain.

Supply Chains

Missile production is not just an engineering or funding challenge—it is a materials problem. Modern missiles depend on a small set of specialised metals and industrial inputs that cannot be easily substituted or rapidly scaled. Europe has only limited domestic access to many of these materials and has spent decades hollowing out its capacity to extract, refine, and stockpile them. Titanium, which is used extensively in missile airframes, propulsion housings, and control surfaces due to its strength-to-weight ratio and heat resistance, is a prime example. Chinese titanium production has exploded in recent decades, reaching 6.1 million tons in 2024, while European production is concentrated in Norway (not in the EU), as other European “producers” such as Belgium mainly export titanium products, not mine the raw material. Relying on Chinese titanium supplies for non-defense manufacturing has not been problem-free, as titanium used in parts manufactured between 2019 and 2023 on civilian aircraft such as Boeing’s 737 Max and 787 Dreamliner, as well as Airbus’s A220, was found to be defective, having been sourced from a supplier falsifying documentation. MBDA has been stockpiling titanium to ensure it can meet its order book.

An antimony mine in Kütahya, western Turkey.

Antimony is a minor element with outsized strategic importance. It is a critical enabler of precision-guided weapons, used to create specialised alloys, flame retardants, and dope semiconductors in systems such as infrared sensors, radar, and secure communications. Antimony-doped semiconductors are often used in missile systems in thermal imaging arrays and infrared seekers, allowing for accurate targeting and tracking in contested environments. Despite this importance, Europe does not currently mine any antimony. Slovakia’s last mine closed in the 1990s, and while significant deposits exist in France, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia, and Greece, none have been brought into production. A proposed mine in Greece is under review, but even if approved, it will take years to yield usable output.

In the meantime, MBDA and other European defence firms rely on Turkish mined antimony. While Turkey is a NATO ally, the political relationship between Ankara and EU capitals is complicated. Disagreements over migration policy, democratic backsliding under President Erdoğan, and Turkish military activity in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean have all raised questions about the long-term stability of the alliance. Again, the lack of any domestic production of such a strategically important input highlights how Europe’s defence industrial base has been allowed to drift into dependency. Antimony is not rare, but it is environmentally challenging to mine, and European countries have prioritized environmental concerns over strategic autonomy. Without firm political backing, the chances of Europe restoring its own supply remain limited.

Semiconductors used in missile systems are not the most advanced chips found in consumer electronics or AI platforms, such as those built by TSMC. They are “legacy chips” - mature, well-tested designs for missile guidance, signal processing, secure communications, and sensor integration. Their value lies in their reliability under high stress, resistance to temperature fluctuations and vibration, and compatibility with older but robust military architectures. However, despite their technical simplicity, these chips became a critical bottleneck during the global semiconductor shortage in 2021-2022.

The situation is complicated further by security considerations. While commercial electronics manufacturing has long relied on Chinese suppliers for low-cost components, defence systems cannot. Any uncertainty about fabrication, provenance, or tampering risks compromising the missile’s integrity. Even a basic processor handling target acquisition cannot be allowed to fail, or worse, be manipulated, in flight. This rules out Chinese supply, not only during wartime but in peacetime stockpiling. MBDA has been working to strengthen its own semiconductor supply chain which are procured in a joint venture with Soitec, acquiring 40% of Dolphin Integration, a French semiconductor design company in 2024, and expanding the production facilities of its subsidiary Matra Electronique, who manufacture semiconductors in Venette.

Missile warheads and rocket motors rely on a small set of energetic compounds that must meet tight chemical tolerances to ensure consistent performance. High explosives such as RDX, HMX, and plastic-bonded explosive (PBX) formulations are used in warheads for systems like the Storm Shadow and ASMPA, while composite solid propellants (often based on ammonium perchlorate or nitrocellulose) are critical for propulsion in missiles such as SPEAR 3, MMP, and Exocet. Final integration of these materials is handled in-house by MBDA, but the company does not manufacture the raw explosive compounds themselves and instead relies on a small network of external suppliers.

The most important of these suppliers is Eurenco, which operates production sites in France, Belgium, and Sweden, and supplies MBDA with RDX, HMX, PBX warhead fills, and a wide range of tailored propellants. Rheinmetall’s joint venture Nitrochemie, with facilities in Germany and Switzerland, also supports missile-related production with single- and multi-base propellants. In Poland, Nitro-Chem produces RDX and TNT primarily for artillery, but has some capacity relevant to warhead applications. Within the UK, explosives manufacturing is focused more on legacy munitions than on high-energy compounds for missiles. Chemring Energetics UK, based in Ardeer, Scotland, produces initiators, delay elements, and pyrotechnic components, and plays a supporting role in fuzing and ignition systems but not in bulk propellant or warhead explosive production. BAE Systems manufactures traditional explosives for naval shells and artillery, but it too relies on foreign suppliers like Eurenco for the materials used in complex missiles. While MBDA UK manages final assembly of warheads and motors at its Bolton facility, the core energetic materials that underpin its missile portfolio still come primarily from the continent.

Even if Europe secures access to critical minerals and components, the energy intensity of defence manufacturing presents a further structural challenge. Missile production depends on stable, high-load industrial power. Foundries for titanium alloys, chemical plants for propellants and explosives, and semiconductor fabrication lines all require uninterrupted energy flows to remain viable. Yet much of Europe’s energy policy in recent years has favoured intermittent renewables over firm baseload capacity, and has resulted in European countries experiencing some of the highest industrial electricity prices in the world. Continuing to move towards intermittent renewables exposes the grid increasingly vulnerable to volatility, price shocks, and reliability gaps, which undermine precisely the heavy industrial activity required for sustained rearmament.

Conclusion

MBDA sits at the heart of Europe’s efforts to rebuild its ability to produce complex weapons systems. It manufactures some of the most advanced missiles in the world and has shown that Europe retains the technical expertise to deliver modern air, sea, and land-based strike capabilities without relying wholly on the United States. But MBDA does not operate independently. Its assembly lines rely on a fragile supply chain stretching across Europe and are dependent on a handful of producers for explosives, specialist metals, semiconductors, and rocket propellants. Without these materials, even the most sophisticated missile designs cannot be delivered at scale.

The war in Ukraine has revealed how shallow this supply chain is. Europe’s stockpiles are depleted, production is slow to scale, and key inputs are vulnerable to external pressure or simply unavailable in sufficient quantities. Rebuilding a fully resilient European missile supply chain will likely require investments exceeding tens of billions of dollars over the next decade, spread across mining, foundries, chemical synthesis plants, and legacy semiconductor fabrication. Even under ideal conditions, much of this capacity will take five to ten years to come online. MBDA is expanding, so its production capabilities will come online faster, and some surging is possible in the event of a genuine crisis, but Europe’s industrial base is still aligned with peacetime assumptions, and to reindustrialize will require a fundamental reassessment of climate-related goals. Trying to rebuild an independent European defense industrial base will be astonishingly expensive while basing electricity production on intermittent renewables. A genuine warfighting economy has yet to be rebuilt, and without it, rearmament risks becoming a political gesture rather than a strategic transformation.