The Chinese Nuclear Industry

China is building reactors faster, cheaper, and at greater scale than any other country. But can nuclear really replace coal, or is this about something else entirely?

Unit 3 of the Guangxi Fangchenggang Nuclear Power Plant in Western China.

China has the world's fastest-growing civilian nuclear energy program. Since Xi Jinping came to power, development has accelerated rapidly, with the country now adding around 4 GW of new capacity each year. By 2030, China will have built more nuclear power stations than the rest of the world combined in the 21st century. It is on track to surpass the United States as the largest generator of civilian nuclear energy, with a target of reaching 200 gigawatts (GW) of capacity by 2035. In 2023, China invested more than $13 billion in new plant construction, and the build times for new power stations are reaching as low as five years.

This was not always the case. China’s early nuclear industry relied heavily on imported technology, equipment, and expertise. That dependency has largely ended. As part of a broader campaign to secure domestic capacity in strategic sectors, China’s nuclear supply chain is now almost entirely sourced from within, with the exception of uranium. The state-owned firms China National Nuclear Corporation and China General Nuclear Power Group are also exporting reactor designs, challenging Western influence at a time when many governments are scrambling for reliable, large-scale sources of low-carbon electricity.

Beijing sees nuclear energy as essential to its long-term strategy for decarbonizing the grid and meeting its 2060 carbon neutrality goal. But building hundreds of reactors, training enough engineers and technicians, and securing stable uranium supplies will be a monumental effort. And even this unprecedented expansion is only just keeping pace. China’s total electricity demand now exceeds 9,450 terawatt hours per year and is growing at approximately seven percent annually. Nuclear power, despite rapid growth, is still only a minor contributor to the country’s overall energy mix. For all its speed and scale, the nuclear buildout still invites a deeper question. Is China pursuing a clearly defined strategy to secure baseload power and economic resilience, or is it primarily chasing prestige in another field where the West has slowed down?

China’s nuclear energy journey.

Despite acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1960s, China deferred developing its civilian nuclear power industry as it dealt with the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao's death, and Deng Xiaoping's rise to power, prioritizing economic development. Although plans for the first Chinese nuclear power plant began in earnest in the 1970s, and construction of China’s first nuclear power plant (Qinshan 1) began in 1985, it wasn’t until 1988 China’s National People’s Congress announced that the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) would be created from the reorganization of the Ministry of Nuclear Industry amid the restructuring of Chinese state owned industries. CNNC had been responsible for the enrichment, reprocessing, and production infrastructure necessary for the creation of China’s nuclear weapons program and therefore had a close institutional relationship with the military and scientific establishment. As a result, the Qinshan 1, a domestically developed CNP-300 pressurized water reactor, was based on the design for the reactor powering the first Chinese nuclear-powered submarine, the Type 091 (Han-class), which itself had its roots in Soviet assistance before the Sino-Soviet split. Qinshan 1’s 300MW reactor was small compared to units being built in the US (a typical US PWR was 900-1,200MW), but the Chinese effort at Qinshan was far more concentrated on developing a domestic design, management, civil engineering, and integration. China lacked the ability to construct the reactor vessel (which was supplied by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) due to a lack of heavy forging capacity or precision engineering capability. Although China claimed that 95% of the work was produced domestically, core components were still imported (primarily from Japan, Canada, and Switzerland) or constructed under close supervision from foreign suppliers.

Qinshan 1 was an impressive achievement and laid the foundations of future nuclear power construction and design in China. Its domestically designed reactor would evolve into the larger CNP-600 and CNP-1000, and eventually be combined with other designs based on foreign reactors to produce the Hualong One (HPR-1000), which is at the core of China’s modern power plant construction program. Although Qinshan was expensive, with a 2.5 billion yuan (about USD $300 million at late 1980s exchange rates or $800m today) construction cost, on a per MW basis, it was not outrageously expensive at $2.65 million per MW in 2025 dollars compared to South Korean efforts in the late 1980s, with a $1.85 million per MW cost for the OPR-1000 reactors.

Qinshan 1 nuclear power plant in Jiaxing, Zhejiang province, 100km from Shanghai.

As Deng’s time as paramount leader became more secure and economic modernization rose up the agenda, developing nuclear power was seen as a vital part of achieving this goal. However, nuclear power was not a part of a strategy to seriously power China’s growing industrial and consumer electricity needs, as China still only had a GDP per capita of $283 (2025 dollars) in 1988 and as Chinese electricity demand grew around 26% annually from 1988 to 2000, only coal could be built fast enough to keep up with the astonishing hunger for electricity. CNNC was not the only state-owned company working on nuclear power. In parallel, China launched another major initiative focused more heavily on international collaboration and technology transfer. This approach mirrored the strategy China had used in other sectors such as textiles and automobiles, where it had learned from foreign partners to accelerate domestic capabilities.

In 1987, construction began on Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant in Guangdong Province, a joint project between the French company Framatome and the China General Nuclear Power Group (CNG). The Daya Bay plant was conceived to supply electricity to both Hong Kong and the Southern Chinese province of Guangdong, and amidst considerable diplomatic tension between the British and Chinese governments over the handover of British-administered Hong Kong, received backing from both Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping. Daya Bay was to be much larger than Qinshan 1, with the French M310 design being used to complete Daya Bay units 1 and 2, each generating 944MW of electricity. Almost all of the core components were French, including the reactor vessel, primary coolant pumps, and turbines. CNG’s more internationally rooted genesis continued to influence its operations, working with Framatome to develop the CPR-1000 reactor, exporting Chinese reactors to Pakistan and building reactors primarily in coastal provinces, unlike CNNC which builds plants inland. CNG, like CNNC, is state-owned and reports to the Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council. CNNC and CGN build, own, and operate China’s nuclear power plants, selling the electricity they generate through guaranteed rates to fund further construction and maintain existing facilities.

Chinese nuclear power plant construction remained at a cautious pace throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. By the end of 2010, China had 13 operational nuclear reactors with a total gross capacity of approximately 10.7 GW, but coal-fired power stations added around 500 GW of generation capacity over the same time period. Despite this, there were significant advancements in reactor technology by both CNNC and CNG during the 2000s. CNNC refined and scaled up the domestically developed CNP-300 design used at Qinshan 1 to produce the CNP-600, a 650 MW pressurized water reactor deployed at Qinshan Phase II, with the first unit coming online in 2002. It also collaborated with Westinghouse and Framatome to develop the CNP-1000, a 1,000 MW reactor intended for the Fangjiashan site. However, the plans at Fangjiashan were ultimately revised in favour of CNG’s CPR-1000 design.

CNG had begun constructing its first CPR-1000 units in 2005, based on the French M310 design but incorporating an increasing share of domestically manufactured components, including eventually Chinese-produced reactor pressure vessels made by Shanghai Electric Heavy Industry Group and Harbin Electric Corporation. Forging large single pieces for a reactor vessel requires massive open-die forging presses (with the ability for 12-15,000 tons of pressure), and Chinese firms worked closely with Japan Steel Works to study their equipment, build new facilities, learn more advanced metallurgy, and enhance their precision engineering. The CPR-1000 offered modest improvements in efficiency, digital control systems, and maintainability, but its key selling point was the domestically manufactured core components. The 11th Five-Year Plan, drawn up in 2006, accelerated the rollout of Chinese indigenous design and construction, setting a target of 45 GW of nuclear generation by 2020.

When Xi Jinping became paramount leader in 2012, China was locked into completing the 12th Five-Year Plan, which he had not been significantly influential in drafting, as it had been proposed by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. As a result, Xi focused first on consolidating control over the Communist Party, eliminating rivals such as Bo Xilai, implementing internal reforms of the military (including the creation of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force), and preparing for the 13th Five-Year plan, which would lay out his economic priorities. In his second term as President, beginning in 2017, his administration accelerated the buildout of Chinese nuclear power plants to strengthen energy security, address international concerns (at least in tone) about carbon emissions, and further enhance Chinese industrial capabilities. These priorities had been elevated somewhat in the 13th Five-Year Plan, but would become even more ambitious as the 14th Plan was formulated. As Xi Jinping has extended his term beyond the post-Deng norms of two terms as President and paramount leader, his focus on enhancing domestic nuclear capacity is likely to remain central to Chinese political goals until he leaves office.

The installation of the Hualong One reactor pressure vessel at No.5 unit of Fuqing nuclear power plant in southeast China's Fujian Province.

How does China support nuclear power?

By the late 2010s, CNNC and CNG had both matured their designs for reactors and were directed to work together on the Hualong One reactor to provide standardization to help reach the 2035 target of 200GW of nuclear generation capacity. The playbook for nuclear power plant construction, in terms of land acquisition, integration with national and local plans, and resources, was now well established. Through state-owned banks, primarily the China Development Bank, financial costs for new power plant construction are heavily supported by state-backed loans with interest rates as low as 1.4 percent (compared to the April 2025 benchmark rate of 3.1%), which cover around 70 percent of the cost of Chinese reactors.

Suppliers of components for nuclear power plants are subject to tax exemptions, as they are eligible to be designated “High and New Technology Enterprises,” which offers a 10% reduction in their corporate tax rate, accelerated depreciation on capital equipment, and VAT refunds or reductions on qualified R&D expenses or equipment. These incentives for suppliers, such as Shanghai Electric Heavy Industry Group and China First Heavy Industries (who make reactor vessels), Dongfeng and Harbin Electric Corporation (who make nuclear steam turbines, generators and control systems) and the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant (a subsidiary of CNNC who produces nuclear fuel assemblies, playing a crucial role in the fuel supply chain for civilian and military nuclear projects) help lower the overall costs of project construction since lower operating margins allow them to offer more competitive pricing.

Provinces actively compete for nuclear projects, which offer high-paying and stable jobs, local tax revenue, and a reliable electricity supply. Land acquisition is relatively frictionless, as nuclear construction is treated as a national priority and enjoys broad political support. In Guangdong (the province with the most nuclear generation at 16 GW) alignment with nuclear goals has helped propel careers, including those of Hu Chunhua and Wang Yang (later Vice Premiers) and Ma Xingrui, who became Party Secretary of Xinjiang.

Prior to 2025, Chinese energy regulation set benchmark prices for all major electricity sources through state planning rather than allowing wholesale prices to fluctuate freely. This system provided predictability and enabled Beijing to channel investment into politically favoured sectors. However, a transition to market-based pricing for wind and solar began in 2021, as the cost of subsidising variable renewable (VRE) energy through feed-in tariffs became increasingly difficult to justify. By 2023, these subsidies had reached $15 billion. The new pricing mechanisms for future projects aim to expose VRE to market signals and test whether China can rely more heavily on VRE if it decides to start retiring parts of its coal fleet, and not experience grid instability and rising electricity costs that have accompanied VRE introductions in Western grids such as the UK, Germany, and Texas. In contrast, nuclear and hydroelectric power in China will continue to benefit from generous long-term subsidy arrangements, reflecting their importance for grid stability and baseload generation. Nuclear-generated electricity in China is currently sold at a benchmark price of around ¥0.43 per kWh, or approximately $59 per MWh. This is significantly lower than the generation costs of nuclear power in many advanced economies. In South Korea, nuclear is produced at around $70 per MWh, in Japan closer to $100, and in the United States about $85. In the United Kingdom, where nuclear power has some of the highest capital costs, new projects such as Hinkley Point C are expected to generate electricity at around $130 per MWh under a government-backed strike price agreement, compensating for the high capital costs and lack of direct state financing. These figures refer to wholesale generation costs, meaning the price paid to producers, and do not include the retail price to consumers, which also covers transmission, distribution, and other system charges.

Chinese Nuclear Innovation

The playbook for new Chinese nuclear power has enabled the fastest-growing construction program in the world and supports some of the most competitive project delivery costs in the energy sector, but the Chinese nuclear industry is increasingly innovative outside of CNNC and CNG’s more common designs. The mainstay of the planned Chinese nuclear program is the Hualong One (HPR-1000) pressurized water reactor. Eighteen Hualong One units are currently either operational or under construction. With an output of around 1,100 megawatts per reactor and a unit cost of approximately ¥20 billion, or about $2.8 billion, the average cost per megawatt is in the range of $2.5 million. This is significantly cheaper than comparable reactors in other advanced economies. South Korea’s APR1400 costs around $3 million per megawatt, Japan’s ABWR designs cost approximately $4 million per megawatt, American AP1000 projects have ranged between $6 and $9 million per megawatt, and the United Kingdom’s EPR-based Hinkley Point C is expected to cost close to $8-10 million per megawatt.

Although the Hualong One is not yet fully modularised, China is increasingly adopting modular construction techniques, where reactor components are manufactured off-site and assembled at the plant. This approach can reduce overall project costs by up to 20 percent and shorten construction times by as much as 30 percent, and as China is already the fastest at delivering new nuclear construction with a typical power station taking four years, modularization could enable a far more ambitious rollout than the current plans of 6-8GW of nuclear capacity a year. The widespread deployment of the Hualong One will not exclude other Chinese-designed reactors from being built. The CAP1400, developed by the State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) in cooperation with Westinghouse based on the AP1000 design, is a scaled-up 1,400 megawatt reactor, and the first unit at Shidao Bay Nuclear Power Plant is currently being commissioned. The TMSR-LF1 is a two megawatt thermal thorium molten salt reactor using liquid fuel. It is a prototype operated by the Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics, and the eventual goal is to develop a scalable commercial molten salt reactor that can contribute to China’s broader nuclear power ambitions and reduce reliance on uranium-based fuel cycles. China Huaneng Group in partnership with the Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology at Tsinghua University and CNNC, have also built the HTR-PM, a 210 MW high-temperature gas-cooled reactor that can be built on smaller grids and is designed for industrial heat applications, hydrogen production, and even process heat for desalination or chemicals manufacturing. A scaled-up version, the HTR-PM600, is in development. Western countries are not currently seriously producing either HTR (Germany was a pioneer in this field but shut down its pebble-bed reactor work in the 1980s and 1990s due to political and public pressure, while the US has a research project with X-Energy but no plants are yet operational) or thorium molten salt reactors.

In the small modular reactor (SMR) category, CNNC has developed the Linglong One (ACP100), a 125 megawatt design. It is aimed at flexible applications such as island energy supply (Linglong One is being built on Hainan Island in Southern China), industrial process heat, district heating, and desalination, and has become the first SMR in the world to begin actual construction with a planned delivery date of 2026.

Beyond the Linglong One, other Chinese SMR designs are also under development. CNNC is advancing the ACP100S, a marine version of the Linglong One intended for shipboard or offshore use, while the CGN is developing its own SMR concept known as the ACPR50. The CFR-600 Fast Breeder Reactor (not a SMR) being built by CNNC is a part of China’s strategy to establish a closed nuclear fuel cycle, a method of managing nuclear fuel that involves reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to extract usable materials (especially plutonium and uranium) so they can be reused in reactors. This ambitious buildout has significant political and institutional support, but can China continue to provide the supply chain necessary to deliver it?

CNNC’s Uranium mining project in the Ordos Basin in Inner Mongolia.

Strategic Autonomy and Fuel Supply

China’s manufacturing base can reliably provide core inputs like concrete, steel, and heavy machinery for its nuclear program. But its primary strategic concern is securing enough nuclear fuel to meet the demands of a rapidly expanding reactor fleet. Each Hualong One reactor contains 157 fuel assemblies, each made up of 264 rods and approximately 500 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU). One-third of these assemblies are replaced every 18 months, translating to an average annual requirement of about 20 tonnes of LEU per reactor. At present, China consumes around 13,000 tonnes of uranium metal (tU) each year, but domestic production was just 1,700 tonnes in 2022. If the current buildout proceeds, annual demand could reach 40,000 tonnes, nearly equal to the total global production of 49,355 tonnes in 2022.

Although China holds an estimated 2.8 million tonnes of uranium in 21 fields and basins, its ore grades are poor, often as low as 0.1 percent compared to the 10 percent grades in Canadian mines. Development has lagged due to these quality issues, technical challenges, and environmental concerns. CNNC began work in 2024 on what is expected to be its largest uranium mining project in the Ordos Basin in Inner Mongolia, but production figures remain undisclosed. Alternative approaches like extracting uranium from seawater are still experimental and years away from commercial viability.

To hedge against these constraints, China has prioritized foreign supply. CNNC owns stakes in uranium mines across Kazakhstan, Namibia, Niger, and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan, in particular, is a strategic partner. CNNC co-owns mines with Kazatomprom, the world’s largest uranium producer, and purchases additional material through long-term agreements. While China also holds contracts with mines in Australia and Canada, worsening relations with the West could limit future access. For this reason, China is expanding its foreign mine portfolio in politically aligned or neutral countries. In a wartime scenario, it would likely rely on its strategic stockpile (estimated at around 120,000 tonnes of uranium) and its partnership with Kazakhstan to maintain fuel supply.

To further insulate itself, China is working to establish a closed nuclear fuel cycle. This involves reprocessing spent fuel to recover plutonium and combining it with depleted uranium to fabricate mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The CFR-600 fast breeder reactor is a pilot project in this effort and may produce around 200 kilograms of plutonium annually. However, most of China’s current commercial reactors are not designed to use MOX, and the full infrastructure for a closed fuel cycle (including reprocessing facilities, MOX fuel lines, and fast reactors) does not yet exist at scale. Establishing this system for a 200 GW nuclear fleet would cost an estimated $75 billion and would require dozens of CFR-class reactors and extensive new support infrastructure. Although the fast breeder program is officially civilian, its dual-use potential also strengthens China’s military nuclear base.

China’s nuclear fuel fabrication capacity is already extensive and expanding in parallel with new reactor builds. Most fabrication is handled by CNNC at its Yibin and Baotou facilities, which have a combined annual capacity exceeding 2,000 tonnes of uranium, comparable to France’s Framatome and nearly matching Russia’s TVEL. This is far ahead of current U.S. domestic capacity. The Baotou plant is also being upgraded to produce MOX and TRISO fuel, and expansion costs are estimated at $500 million to $1 billion per additional 1,000 tonnes of capacity. Conventional low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel produced in China costs under $200 per kilogram, significantly cheaper than the $300 to $400 per kilogram typical in the United States or Europe. Fabrication is tightly integrated with upstream mining, conversion, and enrichment activities, forming a domestically controlled supply chain that reduces exposure to external shocks. This system also positions China to offer long-term fuel contracts to international customers buying its reactors.

Compared to most Western countries, China is dramatically outpacing nuclear development. The average U.S. nuclear power plant is now 42 years old. Only one new reactor has entered service in the United States this century—Vogtle Unit 3 in Georgia. Its Westinghouse AP1000 design took over a decade to complete and cost between $17 and $18 billion for 1,100 MW of capacity, or roughly $15 to $16 million per megawatt. Vogtle Unit 4 followed at a lower cost of $11 billion. Other U.S. projects have fared worse: the V.C. Summer expansion in South Carolina was abandoned after four years and $9 billion in sunk costs, and proposed plants in Texas, in collaboration with Toshiba, were canceled in 2011. While the Department of Energy has proposed 200 GW of new nuclear capacity by 2050 and aims to add 35 GW by 2035, these targets appear ambitious given the sector’s record of delays and cost overruns. Small modular reactors have drawn attention from private companies such as Du Pont, Open AI, and Google but deployment remains years away and grid-scale plants remain more practical for base load electricity.

Kazakh uranium pellets.

Although the US does have far higher labour costs than China and its expansion of natural gas supply has made the economic case for gas fired generation far stronger over the past decade, the US does possess the necessary technological knowledge and still has some of the industrial base required to deliver nuclear power at lower cost than it currently does. There is nothing particularly special about China or Communism that has allowed its expansion of nuclear power. While the US does not have state-owned banks and its private land ownership prohibits some of the more aggressive tools China has used to power its nuclear rollout, recognizing that China’s success does not come from ideology but from long-term coordination and the political will to invest in complex infrastructure will go a long way to mitigate some of the US’s weaknesses. The IRA Zero-Emission Nuclear Power Production Credit is a powerful tool to help get new nuclear energy built. It provides a tax credit of up to $15 per megawatt-hour for existing nuclear power plants, helping prevent early closures in competitive markets. Running through 2032, it should incentivise new construction by stabilising the industry, reducing investor risk, and signalling long-term federal support for nuclear energy as a zero-emission power source. With US power demand expected to increase 15-16% by 2029, it could be central to meeting future nuclear power plant construction.

Geopolitics, Energy Security, and the Coal Dilemma

The implications of China’s nuclear buildout are substantial. If China meets its target of 200 GW of installed nuclear capacity by 2035, it could generate over 1,600 terawatt hours of electricity annually, roughly 15 percent of projected demand. While coal can be stockpiled for weeks or months, nuclear fuel can be stockpiled years in advance, offering long-term security in a crisis. In the event of a major conflict, including one over Taiwan, this means nuclear plants could continue generating power even if fuel imports are disrupted. Despite their well-known locations and the grave risks associated with uncontrolled shutdowns, nuclear power stations have historically been treated with some restraint in conflict zones due to the potential for catastrophic radioactive release. While this norm has been tested by recent drone and missile strikes on Ukrainian nuclear sites, the international backlash and strategic risks associated with such attacks have so far prevented any deliberate effort to trigger a major nuclear incident. In a major conflict, nuclear power stations remain at risk, but may still be considered less expendable targets than conventional baseload infrastructure. In the event of a war over Taiwan, although Taiwanese, US, Japanese or South Koreans strikes against Chinese grid infrastructure would be considered if the conflict was not resolved quickly and adversaries had to consider degrading the military industrial base of China, attacking nuclear power stations with precision munitions would risk a radiation leak, reactor meltdown and retaliatory strikes by Chinese forces on civilian nuclear infrastructure.

Although US and China face the realistic but unlikely chance of war, US reorientation towards China’s growing military and industrial power has strained relations with its NATO European allies. A remote scenario, given European concerns over Chinese human rights abuses and accusations of spying, but potentially a plausible one given the deep economic links between European nations and China, not just on consumer goods such as battery electric vehicles but also variable renewable infrastructure, is that US and European relations may degrade to the point where China is invited back into European countries to provide more substantial infrastructure. Countries such as the UK have previously allowed Chinese companies to be involved in developing nuclear power infrastructure, and with a demand for baseload power across Europe, cheap Chinese reactors that can be built in short timescales may become increasingly attractive. Although Chinese and European cooperation is unlikely, CNG has exported its Hualong One reactor designs to Pakistan to build the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant which began generating power in 2021. The per MW cost was $4.4 million, far more expensive than domestic production, but it delivered civilian power in a country that could otherwise not afford (China provided $6.5 billion of the $9.6 billion cost in financing) to develop its own civilian nuclear power. Pakistan's previous civilian nuclear power station, Chashma Nuclear Power Complex, was also built with Chinese reactors and assistance. As countries across the world seek access to more electricity generation, China is in a good position to provide access to its reactor designs, although it may be competing more often with Rosatom, which is the key player in Russia's nuclear industry and has built nuclear power plants in Bangladesh and Turkey. Countries that require assistance to build nuclear power stations, who don’t enjoy the friendliest of relations with Western countries, such as Egypt, Kenya, Thailand, and Kuwait are all potential options for increased cooperation with the Chinese nuclear industry.

Even as China exports nuclear technology abroad and sharpens its geopolitical influence through infrastructure deals, the greatest test of its nuclear program remains at home. Despite the scale of China’s nuclear ambitions, coal still dominates the country’s energy mix, with its 1,161 coal-fired power stations generating 61% of its electricity in 2023. Coal has been central to cheap industrial electricity prices, which have powered Chinese industrialization, and as countries such as Vietnam seek to use their now lower labour costs to follow the Chinese model of development, rising energy prices in China will reduce competitiveness and weaken the wider economy. Coal dependency presents a dilemma of how to expand nuclear power fast enough to matter, without triggering the social and political backlash that could come from undermining one of China’s most entrenched and politically sensitive industries. Over half of the world's coal miners are Chinese, and more than half of China's rail freight capacity is used to deliver coal.

China moves billions of tons of coal a year on its rail network.

While the case for relying on coal has weakened slightly as China has moved to higher value manufacturing which is not as dependent on ultra-cheap electricity and concerns not only about China’s contributions to global carbon emissions, but the effects of coal on air quality and healthcare costs in an ageing society, it will still be difficult to move China away from coal. China cannot replicate the move towards natural gas, which has contributed to carbon emission reductions in the US and other Western countries. It is already the third-largest consumer of natural gas and the biggest importer of LNG for use in manufacturing and residential heating. Substituting coal for gas would require the costly replacement of China’s 1,080 GW of coal capacity. Although coal is baseload power, meaning it can generate electricity when needed and is not dependent on weather conditions, its actual capacity factor (meaning how often it generates power) has dropped to around 55% in 2022 from 70% in 2006. Partly, this is reflective of the huge increases in variable renewable generation capacity, but also of limits on generation due to political concerns on air quality, and the average age of a coal power station being 32 years old, and parts of that fleet requiring more maintenance. Nuclear, on the other hand, as clean baseload power, has capacity factors approaching 90%, meaning it can consistently provide power.

The scale of a nuclear buildout required to replace coal by 2050 and maintain a reasonable rate of growth in electricity demand would be staggering. It would require China to build around 43 GW of new nuclear capacity a year. If enough high-grade steel and other components could be produced, the cost would be around $110 billion a year, or about half of what China says it spends on its armed forces. Although the state would not be directly financing this buildout, it could conceivably be underwriting it if it continued to provide generous loans to CNNC and CNG. The current work on securing enough uranium to power this capacity would be woefully inadequate. Fortunately for Chinese political leaders, it is not currently planning to do this and aims to phase out coal by 2060 through a mixture of variable renewables, increased hydroelectricity, and nuclear generation.

Conclusion

China’s nuclear buildout is not a curiosity. It is one of the most significant energy and industrial undertakings in the world today. It reflects a state that can set long-term goals, align institutions, and deliver large-scale infrastructure in a way that few democracies now manage. Nuclear energy offers a route to reliable baseload electricity, greater energy independence, and long-term geopolitical leverage. And yet, its deeper logic is somewhat mystifying. China’s current nuclear trajectory is impressive, but still falls far short of replacing coal, rapidly reducing carbon emissions or improving air quality. Combined with the rollbacks to intermittent renewable subsidies, continued coal-fired power station construction and also public pronouncements about reducing Chinese carbon emissions, the current Chinese energy policy is not aligned on any single objective.

Although China’s unique model of government allows long-term planning, significant marshalling of resources and can deliver world historical infrastructure, it appears that Xi Jinping's political ambitions are not centered on any one direction for future Chinese energy policy. Viewed through this lens, China's achievements in developing a world-beating nuclear power industry are better understood as providing options for future leaders on how to best deliver electricity to the worlds largest manufacturing base. The seriousness with which developing this capability reflect a Chinese political elite that can prepare for a variety of future scenarios, whether that be nuclear being the only plausible way of delivering reliable power, if variable renewables can have their problems of intermittency solved with cheaper storage and technological developments to manage their instability, or if the world abandons climate concerns and China can adapt more slowly to future energy supply at its own pace.

Nuclear power may still become a central pillar of Chinese energy security. It may yet allow Beijing to reduce emissions, sustain industrial output, and make its grid more resilient. But the more important lesson is not about China’s success. It is about its seriousness. China is building, not talking. If Western countries want to rebuild their own nuclear industries, they will have to start by deciding whether they are serious too.